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uring the 1980s, agricultural-sector reforms in many developing coun-
tries led to the dismantling of rural producer organizations (RPOs)—
farmers’ organizations, associations, and cooperatives. This was part 
of a larger process aimed at reducing the role of the state in the economy, 
eliminating inefficiencies in food production, and encouraging the growth of 
competitive markets in the agricultural sector. These reforms assumed that 
the private sector would replace the state as the key source of agricultural 
inputs and marketing services for smallholder farmers. While this has occurred 
in some countries with respect to cash crops, it is far less common in the 
case of staple foodcrops—crops that are critical to the livelihoods of the vast 
majority of smallholders in the developing world.
  In recent years, RPOs have reappeared on the international development
agenda as a potentially important means of linking farmers to markets, increas-
ing agricultural productivity, and ultimately reducing rural poverty. Innova-
tive RPO models are being held up as the key to helping smallholders better 
manage the procurement and distribution of inputs, aggregate their surplus 
farm output, and bargain for better terms of trade in the marketplace. These 
same models are also being leveraged to help government agencies and non-
governmental organizations to better identify and reach out to the rural poor 
with an array of social and economic welfare programs.
  However, it is not clear how effective these RPO models may be, particu-
larly for smallholders who cultivate food staples. What is missing is a suffi-
cient body of evidence on where, when, and how RPOs benefit the rural poor—
a significant gap in light of the checkered history of cooperatives in many 
countries. While evidence suggests that cooperatives play a constructive role 
when high-value agricultural commodities such as dairy and horticultural 
products are involved, there is far less evidence of their contribution to 
increasing returns to farmers who cultivate staple foods, particularly cere-
als. This is because food staples are quite different from high-value crops in 
that they rarely offer the lucrative returns to farmers that high-value crops 
do. Staples are also more susceptible to distortions caused by urban-biased 
price-control policies and the competing price effects of food aid and food 
imports.FOREWORD  xi   
  Ethiopia presents an important case in point. Low productivity, high trans-
action costs, limited use of modern inputs, and minimal levels of commercial-
ization among small-scale, resource-poor farmers are defining characteristics 
of agriculture in Ethiopia. The results—endemic rural poverty and chronic 
food insecurity—are all too well known.
  Yet farmers, policymakers, and administrators in Ethiopia have made 
concerted efforts in recent decades to reverse this situation. One particular 
effort has been to strengthen the role of farmers’ cooperatives in marketing 
farm output, thereby reducing the costs of moving agricultural commodities 
from farmers to consumers and improving farmers’ bargaining power in the 
country’s expanding market economy.
  This study provides some new empirical evidence that may help us under-
stand the conditions under which cereal marketing cooperatives are promot-
ing smallholder commercialization and generating rural welfare improvements 
in Ethiopia. We hope that this evidence will provide new insights for policy-
makers, researchers, and development practitioners who are encouraged by 
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xivSummary
T
he commercialization of crops grown by small-scale, resource-poor 
farmers has the potential to increase household food security, reduce 
rural poverty, and contribute to agricultural development and econo-
mywide growth. By encouraging the application of modern inputs and farming 
techniques, diversification out of low-yielding subsistence crops, and spe-
cialization in more tradable crops, commercialization can increase farming 
incomes, enhance purchasing power, and reduce vulnerability among small-
holders. If the positive output shocks resulting from large-scale technological 
changes are offset by short-term policies to manage the resulting negative 
price and income effects, this commercialization process can rapidly shift 
smallholders from low-productivity, low-income traps to higher-productivity, 
higher-income livelihood systems that are integrated into the wider modern 
economy.
  However, in the face of imperfect markets, high transaction costs, and agro-
climatic risks, few smallholders in Sub-Saharan Africa have been able to real-
ize the potential gains from commercialization. This is particularly true with 
regard to smallholders who cultivate food staples. Such crops constitute the 
bulk of agricultural production in Africa and employ the majority of people, 
and therefore hold the greatest potential for poverty reduction on the conti-
nent. Commercialization of food staples—especially cereal crops—in the region 
is very low due to their generally low returns to producers, nondifferentiabil-
ity in local markets, susceptibility to urban-biased price controls, and vulner-
ability to the competing price effects of food aid and food imports.
  Without appropriate institutional mechanisms to improve the market in-
centives for cereal production, smallholders throughout the region are unlikely 
to realize the benefits of commercialization any time soon. Rural producer 
organizations (RPOs)—such as farmers’ organizations, producers’ associations, 
and rural cooperatives—represent one such mechanism. After a 25-year hiatus, 
RPOs have returned to the policy agenda as a means of promoting equitable 
growth and poverty reduction. By leveraging the power of collective action, 
RPOs are expected to help smallholders gain a footing in competitive markets, 
help development partners in reaching the poor, and provide a voice to under-
represented communities and households in rural areas.
xvxvi  SUMMARY
  However, empirical evidence about how RPOs contribute to growth and 
development in smallholder-based agriculture is required in order to help 
realize the potential of RPOs. This study meets the need for evidence through 
an intensive analysis of data from two in-depth surveys conducted in Ethiopia 
in 2005 and 2006. The analysis aims to identify the conditions under which 
RPOs engaged in cereal marketing successfully promote smallholder commer-
cialization and to determine how the benefits are distributed.CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Smallholder Commercialization, Food Staples, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa
S
mallholder commercialization and rural welfare are closely linked con-
cepts. There is extensive theoretical and empirical evidence showing 
how the commercialization of small-scale, resource-poor farmers can 
lead to increases in household food security and reductions in rural poverty, 
and how these improvements can contribute to agricultural development and
economywide growth (for example, Timmer 1988; Fafchamps 2005). By encour-
aging the application of modern inputs and farming techniques, diversifica-
tion out of low-yielding subsistence crops, and specialization into more tradable 
crops, commercialization can increase farming incomes, enhance purchasing 
power, and reduce vulnerability among smallholders. If the positive output
shocks—the commodity gluts—resulting from large-scale technological changes 
are offset by short-term policies to manage the resulting negative price and
income effects, this commercialization process can rapidly shift smallholders
from low-productivity, low-income traps to higher productivity, higher income 
livelihood systems that are integrated with the wider modern economy.1 The 
evidence from the so-called Green Revolution in Asia during the late 1960s 
is a testament to this, as are other, more incremental processes of small-
holder commercialization in Asia and Latin America since then (Hazell and 
Ramasamy 1991; Rosegrant and Hazell 2000; Hazell and Haddad 2001).
  However, in the face of imperfect markets, high transaction costs, and sig-
nificant agroclimatic risks, few smallholders in Sub-Saharan Africa have been 
able to realize the potential gains from commercialization. This is particu-
1
1 The choice of which policies are appropriate is a matter of debate. Solutions range from 
market liberalization as suggested (Schultz 1978) to redistributive pricing policies (Taylor 1980; 
Streeten 1987) or short-term price stabilizing interventions (Timmer 1997). See Gabre-Madhin, 
Barrett, and Dorosh (2003) for a review of options for addressing the theory of the “agricultural 
technology treadmill” first posited by Cochrane (1958).larly true with regard to smallholders who cultivate food staples—crops that 
constitute the bulk of agricultural production in Africa, employ the majority 
of people, and therefore hold the greatest potential for poverty reduction 
on the continent (Omamo et al. 2006; World Bank 2008). Commercialization 
of food staples—particularly cereal crops—in the region is particularly low 
(Table 1.1).
  Low commercialization of cereals in Sub-Saharan Africa stems from the 
unique and challenging nature of cereals, including their generally low return 
to producers, nondifferentiability in local markets, susceptibility to urban-
biased price controls, and vulnerability to the competing price effects of food 
aid and food imports (see, for example, Gabre-Madhin 2001; Barrett 2008). 
Without appropriate institutional mechanisms to improve the market incen-
tives for cereal production, it is unlikely that smallholders throughout the 
region will realize the benefits of commercialization any time soon.
  Over the past decade, rural producer organizations (RPOs) have re-emerged 
as one such mechanism. Farmers’ organizations, producers’ associations, and 
rural cooperatives have returned to the policy agenda after a 25-year hiatus 
as a means of promoting equitable growth and poverty reduction (see, for 
example, Collion and Rondot 1998; World Bank 2003, 2008). By leveraging the 
power of collective action, RPOs are expected to assist smallholders in aggre-
gating their surplus output, realizing scale economies in marketing, and bar-
gaining for better terms of trade in the marketplace. RPOs are also expected 
to serve as a means of identifying the rural poor, securing grassroots partners 
for state and nonstate development programs, and representing the voice of 
the rural poor in local governance systems. In short, RPOs are viewed as a key 
institutional mechanism to improve rural livelihoods.
  This renewed interest in RPOs is of importance to Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where agriculture is the mainstay of the region’s economy and where agricul-
tural growth and development are decidedly smallholder-based.2 However, 
without empirical evidence on exactly how RPOs contribute to growth and 
development in smallholder-based agriculture, it is unclear how much this 
newfound interest can contribute. Thus, this study aims to better identify 
the conditions under which RPOs specifically engaged in cereal marketing are 
successfully promoting smallholder commercialization and how the benefits 
are distributed, using illustrations from cooperatives in Ethiopia.
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2 Agriculture is the primary source of livelihood for about 65 percent of all people living in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and it accounts for up to 40 percent of the region’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) and around 60 percent of the region’s exports. And more than 90 percent of agricultural 
production is attributable to small-scale farming (Resnick 2004).RPOs: A Historical Perspective
The historical record demonstrates just how valuable RPOs can be to agri-
cultural development. For example, RPOs have played an important role in 
transforming the rural economies of many industrialized countries.3 In the 
European Union there are some 30,000 agricultural cooperatives with 9 million 
members, accounting for 50 percent of the overall market for agricultural inputs 
and 60 percent of the market for agricultural products (Mercoiret, Pesche, and 
Bosc 2006). In the United States, cooperatives control about 80 percent of the
country’s dairy production system and are deeply involved in a range of spe-
cialty agricultural commodities.
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Table 1.1  Participation in staple foodgrain markets, eastern and 
southern Africa
     Percentage
Country Crop  Year  of  sellers  Study
Ethiopia  Maize, teff  1996  25n  Jayne, Zulu, and Nijhoff (2006)
 Barley  1999–2000  10g  Levinsohn and McMillan (2007)a
 Maize    23g
 Sorghum    11g
 Teff    20g
 Wheat    12g
Kenya  Maize  1997  29n  Nyoro, Kiiru, and Jayne (1999)
   1998  34n
    1999  39n  Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja 
          (2004)
    2000  30n  Jayne, Zulu, and Nijhoff (2006)
Madagascar  Rice  1990  32g  Barrett and Dorosh (1996)
    2001  25n  Minten and Barrett (2008)
Mozambique Basic  food  1996–97  14g  Heltberg and Tarp (2002)
 Maize  2001–02  30g  Boughton et al. (2007)
  Maize  2005  16g  Tschirley and Abdula (2007)
 Rice  2002  43n
Rwanda Beans  1986–97  22n  Weber et al. (1988)
 Sorghum    24n
Somalia Maize  1986–87  39n  Weber et al. (1988)
Tanzania  Food  2003  33n  Sarris, Savastano, and Christiaensen
          (2006)
Zambia  Maize  2000  26n  Jayne, Zulu, and Nijhoff (2006)
Zimbabwe Maize  1984–85  45n  Weber et al. (1988)
  Grain  1996  27g  Govereh and Jayne (2003)
Source: Barrett  (2008).
Note:  g means gross; n means net.
aRural households only.
3 See Malassis (2000) for a description of how farmers’ organizations were instrumental in 
France’s agricultural and rural development.  RPOs have also played an important role in Latin America and Asia (see, 
for example, Damiani 2000, 2001; Berdegue 2001). In Colombia, the National 
Federation of Coffee Growers provides marketing services to a half-million 
coffee growers, most of them smallholders with less than 2 hectares of land. 
In India, cooperatives account for 22 percent of domestic milk production. 
They have played a central role not only in organizing milk production and 
marketing among more than 12 million small-scale producers (each holding 
just one or two cows) but also in moving the country out of chronic shortages 
and into the dairy export business (Sharma and Gulati 2003).
  RPOs also have a recognized role to play in the management of natural 
resources, where collective action among small farmers is often a necessary 
condition for sustaining the equitable use of water resources, pasture lands, 
and other common pool resources. Syntheses by Agrawal (2001) and Meinzen-
Dick et al. (2002), among others, provide insight into the importance of group 
size, composition, and structure as factors that contribute to success in the 
collective management of natural resources.
  Of course, RPOs also have a well-known record of failure in many devel-
oping countries. Intractable market constraints, politicization of leadership, 
elite capture, and breakdowns in collective action are just some of the 
factors contributing to RPO failures (see, for example, Tendler [1983] on 
Bolivia and Banerjee et al. [2001] on India). This record of failure is a real-
ity in Sub-Saharan Africa as much as elsewhere in the developing world. To 
provide some context for this study, we review here the history of RPOs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in broad brushstrokes, from the 1960s to the present.
  At the time of the emergence of independent African nations in the 1960s, 
RPOs (more commonly referred to as cooperatives) existed in many African 
countries. In Anglophone African countries, such as Kenya, South Africa, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe, organizations representing the interests of large-scale 
farmers played an important role in lobbying for state support for marketing, 
input supply, and research (Jayne and Jones 1997). Some of these organiza-
tions, such as the Kenya Farmers Association or the Buganda Growers Associa-
tion, were formed as early as the 1920s to organize the collective marketing 
of such cash crops as maize and were closely linked to state marketing boards 
and input supply monopolies (Ariga, Jayne, and Nyoro 2006; Develtere, Pollet,
and Wanyama 2008).
  Several exceptions in Anglophone Africa suggest that colonial authorities 
did have some interest in encouraging cooperatives among small farmers. 
Organizations established in the 1920s, such as the Kilimanjaro Native Farm-
ers Association in Tanganyika or the Buganda Growers Association, sought to 
promote collective marketing of coffee and cotton by “native” smallholders. 
These and other smallholder cooperatives were generally based on very simi-
4  CHAPTER 1lar designs that drew on the colonial experience in South Asia, suggesting a 
one-size-fits-all approach that may have not been entirely appropriate for 
Africa’s many and varied socioeconomic contexts (Kabuga 2005; Develtere, 
Pollet, and Wanyama 2008).
  In Francophone countries, the experience was somewhat different. Colo-
nial legislation dating back to 1893 encouraged the establishment of Sociétés 
Indigènes de Prévoyance, de Secours et de Prêts Mutuels. These Provident 
Societies (which later became “Mutual Societies for Rural Development”) 
were intended to support the production of agricultural commodities among 
small and large farmers with both input and marketing services. As they 
evolved, they took on such characteristics as compulsory membership and 
became vehicles of state influence, though not to the extent seen in Anglo-
phone Africa (Develtere, Pollet, and Wanyama 2008).
  It was not until immediately after independence that the issue of RPOs and 
small-scale farmers took center stage in the region’s agricultural sectors. Newly 
independent governments widely promoted them as a means of modernizing 
the agricultural sector while also building on traditional solidarity norms in 
rural communities (Bosc et al. 2003). For example, these RPOs played a role 
in improving access to household assets and agricultural services for small-
scale farmers in Zimbabwe during the early 1980s and may have contributed 
significantly to the country’s food security following the protracted struggle 
for independence (Bratton 1986).
  In most cases, these cooperatives were closely tied to centrally planned 
production and marketing systems—systems that were fairly unfamiliar to 
smallholders and were designed without allowances for direct control by the
members themselves. They were, in effect, cooperatives without the ben-
efit of cooperators (Bosc et al. 2003). Weak economic incentives, excessive 
state intervention, elite capture, and other forms of rent-seeking behav-
ior did little to modernize agriculture or to generate the surpluses needed 
to foster wider growth, development, and poverty reduction (Lele 1981; 
Braverman, Guasch, and Huppi 1991; Deininger 1995; Jayne and Jones 1997; 
Bosc et al. 2003).
  Policy reforms introduced under the structural adjustment programs of 
the 1980s in many Sub-Saharan African countries significantly diminished the 
role and influence of state-controlled RPOs throughout the region. Yet the 
private investors and entrepreneurs who were, in theory, expected to replace 
these cooperatives as intermediaries between supply and demand failed to 
materialize, except in a few isolated cases relating to high-value crops (Jayne 
and Jones 1997; Dorward et al. 2004; Piesse et al. 2005; World Bank 2008). 
Smallholders whose livelihoods depended on cereals and other food staples 
remained largely tied to the low-productivity, low-income trap.
INTRODUCTION  5     Since the 1990s, a new breed of RPOs has emerged in some Sub-Saharan 
African countries that is defined by three key characteristics. First, these RPOs 
are member-controlled entities (rather than instruments of the state) firmly 
rooted in the rural communities that they mean to serve. Second, they maintain 
voluntary and open membership policies, rather than compulsory membership, 
as in many earlier cooperatives. Third, they often provide a wide array of ser-
vices to their members, ranging from marketing of members’ surplus output to 
the provision of public goods for the community (Bernard et al. 2008; Devel-
tere, Pollet, and Wanyama 2008). Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provide an indication of
the size and extent of these cooperatives in selected Sub-Saharan African 
countries.
  Today there is growing evidence of RPO successes from across the region, 
particularly in the area of agricultural commodity marketing. Examples 
include cotton in Mali (Tefft 2004), green beans in Kenya (Narrod et al. 
2008), coffee in Ethiopia (Kodama 2007), onions in Burkina Faso (KIT and 
IIRR 2008), dairy in Kenya (Sinja et al. 2006), and others that are synthesized 
in Markelova et al. (2008). Yet few of these success stories focus on RPOs 
involved in the production and marketing of food staples. And apart from 
a review by Coulter (2007) on farmer groups and staple-food marketing in 
Africa and one by Shiferaw, Obare, and Muricho (2008) on dry legumes in 
Kenya, few studies examine grain-marketing cooperatives and their impact 
on production, commercialization, and poverty. And fewer still provide rigor-
ous assessments of the extent to which RPOs include poorer households at the 
intracommunity level (Collion and Rondot 2001; Ferris, Engoru, and Kaganzi
2008). Only a couple of reports are based on a quantitative approach (Donnelly-
Roark, Ouedraogo, and Ye 2001 on Burkina Faso; Bernard et al. 2008 on Sen-
egal and Burkina Faso). Given the importance of food-staple production to 
rural livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, the persistent market failures that 
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Table 1.2  Evolution of the number of cooperatives in selected 
countries, 1989–92 and 2005
  Number of active cooperatives  Number of members (million)
 1989–92 2005 1989–92 2005
Ghana 1,000  2,850  n.a.  2.4
Kenya 4,000  7,000  2.5  3.3
Nigeria 29,000  50,000  2.6  4.3
Senegal 2,000  6,000  n.a.  3.0
Source:  Develtere, Pollet, and Wanyama (2008).
Note:  n.a. means not available.constrain the commercialization of food staples, and the potential contribu-
tion that collective action could make to reducing rural poverty, there is 
much to gain from a closer examination of RPOs as a possible solution (Uphoff 
1993; Chirwa et al. 2005; Neven, Reardon, and Hopkins 2005; Mercoiret and 
Mfou’ou 2006; Mercoiret, Pesche, and Bosc 2006; Bernard et al. 2008).
  Past studies of these issues point out that although cooperatives are poten-
tially important in improving price incentives and encouraging small-scale pro-
duction, nonprice factors (such as the composition and design of the coopera-
tive, or the dynamics of collective action) also have a significant influence on 
the supply response from small farmers (Lele 1975; Bebbington 1996; Poulton, 
Dorward, and Kydd 2005; Develtere, Pollet, and Wanyama 2008). In its World 
Development Report (2008), the World Bank highlights the issue in terms of the 
unresolved conflict between efficiency and equity: RPOs must balance com-
munity norms of social inclusiveness and solidarity against business norms of 
professionalism and competitiveness. As policymakers and donors throughout 
Sub-Saharan Africa begin to invest anew in efforts to promote cooperatives, 
there is a need to generate new knowledge about the potential efficiency–
equity trade-offs inherent in grain-marketing cooperatives.
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Table 1.3  Incidence of cooperatives in nine 
African countries
  Population  Number of  Number of members
Country (million)  cooperatives (thousand)
Cape Verde  0.47  300a 6
Egypt 73.4  13,100a 10,150
Ethiopia 72.4 14,400a 4,500
Ghana 21.4 2,850a 2,400
Kenya 32.4  10,640b 3,370
Niger 12.4  11,300c 332
South Africa  45.2  5,000a 75
Senegal 10.3  6,000d 3,000
Uganda 26.6  7,476a 323
  Total  429.8  71,066a 30,136
Source:   Develtere, Pollet, and Wanyama (2008) based on data from various 
government agencies.
Note:  The average penetration rate for all countries is 7 percent.
aIncludes both registered cooperatives and village associations. An estimated 
1,300 are reported to be viable.
bAn estimated 7,000 are reported to be currently active.
cIncludes “pre-cooperatives.” Figures are thought to be problematic (see 
Develtere, Pollet, and Wanyama 2008).
dAlso includes Groupement d’Interet Economique and pre- and non-
cooperatives.Key Concepts and Issues
To better identify the key concepts relating to this study, we examine here 
three issues relating to smallholder commercialization and RPOs. The first issue
focuses on the role of collective action in helping smallholders overcome 
marketing constraints. The second issue concerns the extent to which poorer 
households tend to participate in RPOs. The third issue examines the possible 
constraints on an RPO’s marketing performance. These issues are used to guide 
the empirical elements of this study presented in later sections.
Issue 1: Collective Action Can Help Smallholders 
Overcome Marketing Constraints
Although smallholders in many developing countries have benefited in recent 
decades from technological advances in agriculture, they face relatively greater 
challenges when it comes to commercializing their surplus output (see, for 
example, Dorward et al. 2004; Fafchamps and Hill 2005). One way of explain-
ing the persistently low levels of smallholder commercialization relates to 
the idea of transaction costs: the costs entailed in marketing surplus output 
create a wide differential between selling and purchase prices, limiting the 
benefits smallholders are able to accrue from their market-based exchanges. 
These transaction costs may include the costs associated with finding a partner 
to trade with, delivering the commodity, negotiating a contract, or enforcing 
the agreement (for example, de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991).
  Importantly, some of these transaction costs are fixed (that is, indepen-
dent of the size of the transaction); thus the unit cost of transacting tends to 
decrease as the amount to be sold increases. Therefore—in addition to such 
problems as lack of collateral, distress selling, and information asymmetries—
smallholders typically face proportionally higher transaction costs than do 
other types of sellers because of the small size of each transaction. In some 
cases, it may be more advantageous for a household not to participate in 
the market at all (Goetz 1992; Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000). In other 
words, if the difference between the price received and the transaction 
costs is not at least equal to the reservation price demanded by the producer 
(based, for example, on costs of production), the producer will not engage in 
market transactions.
  Collective action mechanisms can help smallholders reduce the transac-
tion costs of commercializing their surplus output. By pooling their surplus 
output into a single tradable lot and using this larger quantity as the basis 
for negotiating with buyers, they can increase their bargaining power in the 
market and reduce per-unit transaction costs. In short, an organization that 
aggregates its members’ outputs can reward them with increased access to 
market as well as better rewards through higher prices.
8  CHAPTER 1Issue 2: Poorer Households Tend to Participate Less in RPOs
Despite the potential benefits of collective action, there is limited evidence 
that the poorest of the poor either participate in or benefit from such orga-
nizations when the latter are specifically formed for the purpose of commer-
cializing surplus output. For instance, a study by Thorp, Stewart, and Heyer 
(2005) examines 80 case studies of collective action organizations and finds 
that the chronically poor are rarely included in these types of groups; it also 
concludes that their exclusion contributes to a vicious cycle of chronic pov-
erty.4 Chirwa et al. (2005) argue that this failure to participate may reflect 
several factors: lack of productive assets (land, livestock, or equipment), 
financial assets (cash to pay membership fees), or social capital (access to a 
collective action organization based on ethnicity, social status, social ties, or 
other such characteristics).
  Several types of mechanisms may contribute to this apparent exclusion 
of the poorest. First, RPOs may be inclusive at the community level but are 
likely located in more prosperous villages that have higher market opportuni-
ties, lower pressure on land, better cropping opportunities, or lower envi-
ronmental risks (Chirwa et al. 2005; Bernard et al. 2008). Second, within a 
community, poorer households may choose not to participate in these orga-
nizations if the benefits they would derive from it would be too low. Note 
that the household’s gains from participating in the RPO can be measured as 
the per-unit gain in transaction costs obtained through product aggregation, 
multiplied by the household’s level of production. The per-unit gain itself is 
the difference between the per-unit transaction cost the smallholder faces 
when selling her product alone and the per-unit transaction cost that she 
faces when selling through the RPO. For very low levels of production, even 
though the per-unit transaction cost gains will be high, the overall benefits 
will be low because of the small quantity to be commercialized, so that the 
overall benefit may not be sufficient to outweigh the costs of participating 
in the organization.5
  Third, RPOs themselves may choose to restrict their memberships to house-
holds with sufficient production levels. Indeed, in the case of a pure marketing 
organization, the value of each additional member will depend on her con-
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4 Note, however, that even if groups do exclude the very poorest, they may nonetheless contrib-
ute to poverty reduction provided they are formed among the poor (Thorp, Stewart, and Heyer 
2005).
5 A similar problem arises for high levels of production. Although the quantity to be commercial-
ized is high, the gains in per-unit transaction costs are low, leaving the overall benefits from 
membership relatively low. The overall gains from membership are greatest for smallholders 
with an intermediate level of production, suggesting an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
the benefit from participation and the farmer’s production level.tribution to product aggregation (and hence to reducing transaction costs) 
relative to the management costs of including an additional member. Because
per-member management costs are fixed, selection is likely to be biased toward 
larger producers. Although one rarely finds explicit versions of this argument 
in the field, there are various types of membership criteria (including finan-
cial contribution) that can be implicitly interpreted as reflecting such cost 
considerations.
  Finally, in spite of the above, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
poorest of the poor may still benefit from market-oriented RPOs—even when 
they are excluded from membership. Such benefits may be termed spillovers 
that extend beyond the RPO’s membership base and are often linked to the 
RPO’s everyday activities: for example, an RPO may provide a service that 
can be rendered to members and nonmembers alike that cannot be delivered 
in a way that excludes nonmembers.6
Issue 3: Marketing Performance May Be Constrained 
by a Wide Portfolio of Activities
Collective action is not without its costs. The time and effort needed to gov-
ern and manage the organization—to coordinate meetings among members, 
collect their membership fees or other contributions, resolve conflicts and dis-
putes, monitor compliance with the organization’s rules, organize the orga-
nization’s activities, and so on—are transaction costs internal to the RPO. 
Quite naturally, these coordination costs tend to increase with the size of 
the organization. Further, they increase with the heterogeneity of prefer-
ences among members, as intergroup agreement becomes more difficult to 
reach. Another type of cost relates to the scope of the organization’s activi-
ties: RPOs typically have lower management costs when performing several 
related activities than when simultaneously engaged in several entirely inde-
pendent endeavors.
  And indeed, an important feature of RPOs is their frequent engagement 
in wide varieties of activities. For instance, Bernard et al. (2008) find that 
55 percent of market-oriented RPOs in Senegal were also engaged in provid-
ing social activities, as were nearly 70 percent in Burkina Faso. Although it 
seems reasonable that successful organizations contribute to their communi-
ties’ development, several case studies argue that a broad scope of activities 
often comes at the expense of economic performance (see, for example, Lele 
1981; Stringfellow et al. 1997; Coulter et al. 1999; Delion 2000; Collion and 
Rondot 2001; Chirwa et al. 2005; Bernard et al. 2008). Further, the engage-
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6 As documented in Bernard, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2010), exclusive RPOs may also engage in 
public-good services to gain social acceptability in their communities.ment of market-oriented RPOs in social activities is often driven by external
pressures from administrative agencies of the state, foreign donors, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), or interest groups in a community (Chirwa 
et al. 2005; Bernard, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2010).
  With open-membership policies, such a broad portfolio of activities may 
entail other costs as well. As a marketing-oriented RPO expands its activity 
portfolio, it attracts new members with different levels of interest in its 
various activities. Expansion thus increases both the size of the RPO and the 
heterogeneity of membership’s interests, raising coordination costs in the 
organization. Importantly, although these additional members raise coordi-
nation costs, they are likely to contribute less than the original members (or 
not at all) to product aggregation and hence to lowering transaction costs. 
Eventually, this rise in coordination and management costs may negatively 
affect returns for the initial members, who are primarily interested in the 
commercialization services offered by the organization, and discourage them 
from further participation.
  The salience of increased coordination costs depends on the type of 
decisionmaking rule in the RPO. Where consensus of all members is neces-
sary (participatory decisionmaking), reaching a decision in large and hetero-
geneous groups may be very costly. In such cases, concentrating the power 
to make decisions in a restricted number of informed individuals may help 
reduce coordination and management costs, provided these individuals’ 
decisions are respected by other members (see, for example, Tendler 1983; 
Bianchi 2002; Bernard, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2010). Some studies argue, 
however, that participatory governance is a valuable means of enhancing the 
sustainability and effectiveness of the organization by facilitating decisions 
adapted to local conditions and customs (for example, Attwood and Baviskar 
1987). Particularly for an RPO engaged in the provision of public goods, this 
form of governance can result in outcomes that are more desirable to a larger 
share of members (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001). The overall picture is that 
of a trade-off model. A market-oriented RPO is likely to exhibit only two of 
the following three attributes: (1) inclusive membership; (2) participatory 
governance; and (3) marketing performance.
Data and Methods
The present study focuses on the recent (re)development of cooperatives in 
Ethiopia. Data are drawn from two main sources: (1) a nationally represen-
tative survey of smallholder commercialization conducted in 2005 and (2) a 
relatively large survey of smallholder cooperatives conducted in 2006.
  The 2005 Ethiopian Smallholders Commercialization Survey (ESCS 2005) 
was jointly designed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 
INTRODUCTION  11   7 In Ethiopia, kebeles (peasant associations), are the smallest administrative unit below the 
woreda (district) level. For purposes of comparison, kebeles correspond to a cluster of villages 
in many other Sub-Saharan African countries.
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the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI), and the Central Sta-
tistical Agency of Ethiopia, with the aim of providing an in-depth analysis of 
smallholders’ commercialization behavior. Data were collected in mid-2005 
and include 7,186 households randomly drawn from 293 kebeles.7 The sample
is considered representative at the national and regional levels for four regions: 
Amhara; Oromia; the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples regional 
state (SNNP); and Tigray. The survey covered a large number of issues,
including demographics, human capital stock, employment, land production 
and input use, crop and livestock production and disposition, marketing 
channels and contractual arrangements, physical assets, social capital, and 
participation in cooperatives. However, the ESCS did not collect information 
on household consumption and expenditures.
  The 2006 Ethiopian Cooperatives Survey (ECS 2006), conducted by IFPRI 
and EDRI, was designed to examine the role played by cooperatives in the 
commercialization of Ethiopian smallholders’ surplus grain production. Data 
were collected in mid-2006 across four regional strata (Amhara, Oromia, 
SNNP, and Tigray) from 205 cooperatives in 54 woredas. In each stratum, 14 
woredas were randomly selected, and a maximum of four agriculture-related 
cooperatives were then randomly chosen from a list available at each woreda 
cooperative office. For each cooperative, questions were asked about the 
organization’s history, membership, activities (including marketing), gover-
nance structure, and external links. Of the 205 cooperatives surveyed, 172 
(84 percent) declared that they were primarily engaged in marketing mem-
bers’ grain production, and these cooperatives are used in this analysis.
  Because the samplings conducted under ESCS 2005 and ECS 2006 did not 
sufficiently overlap, household and cooperative data cannot be matched in 
our analysis. The regression analyses presented in the following chapters are 
therefore limited to one dataset at a time. Moreover, a full year separates 
the data collection undertaken for these two surveys. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the phenomena investigated in this monograph are sufficiently 
stable to allow for statistical analysis of data from both surveys to be used in 
the same discussion.CHAPTER 2
Ethiopian Cooperatives
Agriculture, Commercialization, and Public Policy
A
griculture is the backbone of Ethiopia’s economy, accounting for 40 
percent of GDP, 85 percent of employment, and 90 percent of export 
earnings. Furthermore, agriculture in Ethiopia is largely a smallholder 
phenomenon: as of 2001/02, about 37 percent of the farming households in 
the country cultivate less than 0.5 hectares and about 87 percent cultivate 
less than 2 hectares; only 0.9 percent cultivate more than 5 hectares (CSA 
2003). Consequently, the agriculture sector in Ethiopia is host to 90 percent 
of the country’s poor. Cereals (mainly teff, wheat, maize, barley, sorghum, 
and millet) constitute the most important crop for smallholder livelihoods in 
Ethiopia. Some 98 percent of all cereals produced in Ethiopia are produced by 
small-scale farmers. Cereals are cultivated on 75 percent of cropped land and 
represent 69 percent of total crop production (Gabre-Madhin 2001).1
  Cereal production by smallholders is primarily for subsistence in Ethiopia. 
Only 28 percent of the country’s total agricultural output and 30 percent of 
smallholder grain production is marketed (Dessalegn, Jayne, and Shaffer 1998; 
CSA 2003). More recent estimates suggest that among all teff producers, only 
38 percent sell part or all of their production; other estimates suggest even 
lower figures for other cereals (Alemu, Gabre-Madhin, and Dejene 2006).
  Accordingly, the Government of Ethiopia’s (GoE’s) economic growth strat-
egy, Agriculture Development–Led Industrialization, has placed high priority 
since the early 1990s on accelerating agricultural growth through the com-
mercialization of smallholder production (FDRE 2002, 2005). The strategy has 
driven the introduction of policies to promote (1) a more supportive macro-
economic framework for growth and development; (2) liberalized markets 
for agricultural products; and (3) a strong extension- and credit-led push to 
13
1 In terms of value, the share of permanent crops is greater, given their higher market prices. 
This is particularly true of coffee and khat. Figures in this paragraph are computed from data 
generated by the Ethiopian Sample Enumeration Survey 2001/02 (CSA 2003).intensify staple production with modern inputs, especially seed and fertilizer. 
The resulting reforms have liberalized many aspects of the economy: lower-
ing tariffs and relaxing import quotas, simplifying licensing procedures and 
privatizing state enterprises, establishing private banks and easing foreign 
exchange controls, discontinuing compulsory grain delivery and forced mem-
bership in cooperatives by smallholders, and developing input-supply programs 
to intensify cereal output and efficiency.
  Although these reforms increased market integration, market competi-
tion, and private trading in local grain markets, wider systemic and structural 
constraints may have limited the impact of reforms. A fundamental problem 
facing the country is the persistently high transaction costs associated with
trading agricultural commodities (Dercon 1995; Negassa and Jayne 1997; Gabre-
Madhin 2001). Inadequate market information systems that do not provide 
smallholders and traders with price information, when coupled with poor 
infrastructure and weak private-sector capacity, significantly impede com-
mercialization of the country’s largely subsistence-oriented smallholder 
population (Gabre-Madhin et al. 2003; Alemu, Gabre-Madhin, and Dejene 
2006). Indeed, these factors are believed to have contributed to a farming 
crisis in 2002–03 when, following a good harvest and sizable grain surpluses,
grain prices dropped dramatically by 60–80 percent (Gabre-Madhin et al. 2003).
These factors may have also played a significant role in the 2007–08 food 
crisis when, despite good harvests in previous years, grain consumer prices 
increased by up to 50 percent.
  This chapter describes the historical development of agricultural coopera-
tives in Ethiopia until their recent redeployment. We assess their relevance for 
the challenge of smallholder commercialization, their organizational features, 
and their prevalence. Finally, we present a series of statistics along with case 
studies, to describe “typical” agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia today.
Public Support for Cooperative Development in Ethiopia
In spite of the challenges mentioned above, the GoE has placed coop-
eratives at the forefront of its efforts to boost agricultural productivity and 
smallholder commercialization. The GoE’s current strategy aims to extend 
cooperative services throughout the country to supply production inputs to 
smallholders and to market surplus output from them.
Historical Legacy of Cooperatives in Ethiopia
RPOs have a long history in Ethiopia, particularly in the form of traditional 
collective action organizations, such as work groups (jiges, wonfels, debos), 
rotating savings and credit associations (iquobs), and burial societies (idirs), 
which are still very much present (Table 2.1). It was not until the early 1950s 
14  CHAPTER 2that a formal cooperative movement began in the country, and only in 1961 
did the imperial government introduce the first formal proclamation on coop-
eratives that gave rise to the institution in its modern sense (Couture et al. 
2002; Kodama 2007).
  During the imperial era, cooperatives were primarily created to support 
the production of high-value agricultural exports, such as coffee. Membership 
consisted of farmers with large landholdings and tended to exclude small-
holders. By 1974, the end of the imperial era, only 149 cooperatives existed
in the entire country, including 94 multipurpose, 19 savings and credit, 19 con-
sumer, and 17 handicraft cooperatives (Lelisa 2000, cited in Lemma 2008). 
The military (Derg) regime that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991 introduced 
a new type of cooperative, based on more Marxist principles aimed at ending 
capitalist exploitation of the peasantry (Rahmato 1990; Kodama 2007). During 
this period, the government established a massive network of cooperatives 
to organize peasants, manage production and purchasing, and sell inputs and 
consumer goods to members. At its height, the network included more than 
7,700 primary (that is, community-level) cooperatives and 4.8 million mem-
bers (Table 2.2).
  There were two main types of farmers’ cooperative during the Derg: 
service cooperatives and producer cooperatives. The former were charged 
with managing input supply, credit, output purchasing, milling services, and 
the sale of consumer goods for smallholders. The latter were collective 
production units that were ultimately found to be one-third less produc-
tive than individual farms (Rahmato 1994b; Kodama 2007). Both types of 
cooperatives played a central role, alongside the kebele administration, in 
levying and collecting taxes from smallholders, extending state control to the 
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Table 2.1  Households reporting membership in traditional institutions
  Percentage of
Institution sampled  households
Traditional institutions
  Idir (burial society)  42.2
  Iquob (rotating savings and credit association)  6.9
  Other credit and savings association  0.3
  Mahaber (traditional collective-action organization)  3.8
  Senbete (church group)  2.8
  Mosque group  0.1
  Other  0.3
Formal cooperative  9.1
  Households reporting membership in at least one traditional institution  47.0
Source:  Based on data from ESCS (2005).local level, and promoting a socialist ideology. Farmers came to view these 
cooperatives—as well as their state-appointed leaders—as synonymous with 
government oppression. It was not until 1989 that some degree of liberaliza-
tion was introduced, though it proved to be too little and too late, as the 
Derg was overthrown by 1991.
Policies Supporting a New Generation of Cooperatives
Since 1994, the GoE has made efforts to promote a generation of coopera-
tives that differ from their predecessors. The new type of cooperative should 
be (1) based on “peasants’ free will to organize”; (2) able to fully participate 
in the free market; and (3) free of government intervention in their internal 
affairs (Proclamation 85/1994, published in FDRE [1994], 1). Legal reforms in 
1998 and 2004 were introduced to reinforce these principles and strengthen 
membership incentives by improving members’ rights in the areas of owner-
ship, voting, share transfers, and risk management (Proclamations 147/1998
and 402/2004, published in FDRE [1998] and FDRE [2004], respectively; Rah-
mato 2002). The reforms are meant to ensure that cooperatives are governed 
in accordance with standard bylaws that provide for regular election of chair-
persons and management committees and for voting based on the principle 
of one member, one vote. In the broadest terms, these reforms are designed 
to create a new generation of cooperatives in Ethiopia that are voluntary, 
inclusive, and accountable, in stark contrast to the cooperatives formed under 
Ethiopia’s previous regime.
  The GoE’s various poverty-reduction strategy papers also reflect its sup-
port for cooperatives. For example, Ethiopia’s Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Program (FDRE 2002, 43) includes cooperatives as one of 
its main goals for agricultural development: “to organize, strengthen and 
diversify autonomous cooperatives to provide better marketing services and 
serve as a bridge between small farmers (peasants) and the non-peasant pri-
vate sector.” Cooperatives are also expected to
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Table 2.2  Rural organizations during Ethiopia’s Derg regime, 1988–89
    Number of household  Number of 
Type of organization  Number  members (million)  kebeles covered
Peasant associations  20,455  5.7  n.a.
Producer cooperatives  3,732  0.3  n.a.
Service cooperatives  4,052  4.5  17,785
Sources: Adapted from Rahmato (1994a); Kodama (2007).
Note:   n.a. means not available. A kebele is a peasant association, the smallest administrative 
unit in Ethiopia.render vital services other than those related to agricultural marketing, 
including the following: (i) Expanding financial services in rural areas; 
(ii) Purchase of agricultural machinery, equipment and implements, 
and lease them to farmers; (iii) Setting up of small agro-processing 
industries where processed agricultural products with greater value 
added could be produced and (iv) Establishing various social institu-
tions to provide different kinds of social services. (FDRE 2002, 59)
  This thrust continues in the current poverty-reduction strategy, which 
explicitly emphasizes the need to support producer cooperatives as a means 
of strengthening and empowering smallholders’ market participation in the 
liberalized market environment (FDRE 2005).
  Running parallel to this state-led promotion of cooperatives is the effort 
by civil society to encourage farmer organizations at the grassroots level. Dif-
ferent types of these community-based organizations (CBOs) exist throughout 
Ethiopia, ranging from savings and credit associations that provide rural micro-
finance services to groups that organize the marketing of such crops as honey 
and organic coffee. A motivating force behind the growth of CBOs is the exten-
sive community of NGOs in Ethiopia. NGOs are important actors in Ethiopia: 
although their activities were generally limited to famine relief in the 1970s 
and 1980s, many are now working on issues related to sustainable agriculture 
and rural development. As of 2000, some 368 NGOs operated in Ethiopia, of 
which one-third were international organizations (Rahmato 2002).
Administrative Structures to Promote Cooperatives
In 2002, the GoE established the Federal Cooperatives Commission (now the 
Federal Cooperatives Agency, or FCA) with a broad mandate: to oversee the 
appropriate implementation of cooperative legislation, to design policies 
and legal procedures consistent with international conventions on coopera-
tives, and to ensure the coherence of cooperative policy with other relevant 
sectors (land, labor and employment, customs and taxation, and financial 
regulations) (Lemma 2008). The FCA guides cooperative promotion efforts 
throughout the country, working through regional state Bureaus of Coopera-
tive Promotion (BoCPs), whose mandate extends down to the woreda and 
kebele levels.2 Cooperative promotion efforts at the woreda level are man-
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2 This allocation of responsibilities reflects Ethiopia’s wider process of political, fiscal, and 
administrative decentralization, introduced following the downfall of the Derg in 1991 and codi-
fied in the 1994 Constitution. The process led to a novel reallocation of powers to the country’s 
nine regions and the urban administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Today each region 
and administration enjoys wide executive and legislative powers and is financed through a com-




























Figure 2.1  Actors and relationships in cooperative promotion and 
development, Ethiopia, 2007
Source: Authors.
aged through woreda offices of the BoCPs—typically, an office housed in the 
woreda offices of the Bureaus of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARDs). 
Promotion efforts at the kebele level are conducted through direct interac-
tions with local community leaders and farmers themselves. These efforts 
are often supported by the BoARDs’ development agents (as extension agents 
are known in Ethiopia), working individually or through farmer training centers. 
(These centers, introduced over the past several years, are meant to serve ETHIOPIAN COOPERATIVES  19   
as focal points for training and extension activities.) Given the integrated 
nature of their work, BoCPs and BoARDs maintain close working relationships 
that are supported by formal accountability systems at both the woreda and 
regional levels (Spielman et al. 2010).
  Increasingly, cooperatives are organized as part of larger cooperative 
unions, which are umbrella organizations that provide input supply and mar-
keting services to their member cooperatives. These cooperative unions are 
playing an increasingly central role in importing and packaging chemical fer-
tilizer and other inputs and in distributing inputs to cooperatives throughout 
the country (Byerlee et al. 2007). Figure 2.1 summarizes the interaction of 
the various bodies involved in cooperative promotion in Ethiopia.
The Prevalence of Cooperatives in Ethiopia
The new policy regime and administrative structure have substantially pro-
moted the growth of cooperatives over the past 10–15 years. Figure 2.2 shows 
how the number of kebeles with at least one cooperative grew from only 
































Figure 2.2  Kebeles with at least one cooperative, 1991–2005
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).20  CHAPTER 2
Table 2.3  Number of registered primary cooperatives and members by 
region, Ethiopia, 2007
 Number       
  of primary        Total capital
Region cooperatives  Male  Female  Total  (birr)
Amhara 4,223  1,637,069  258,996  1,896,065  165,040,320
Oromia 2,957  658,763  58,284  717,047  104,763,293
SNNP 5,512  892,788  126,076  1,018,864  201,079,907
Benshangul 1,32  6,675  1,742  8,417  4,058,904
Harrari 216  5,288  2,258  7,546  11,424,448
Gambella 81  1,144  2,553  3,697  946,443
Afar 202  4,971  3,649  8,620  6,115,598
Tigray 1,335  356,868  282,425  639,293  42,334,481
Addis Ababa  7,262  n.a.  n.a.  338,321  60,426,253
Dire Dawa  7,15  10,685  5,672  163,57  8,093,956
Somali 449  7,776  6,939  147,15  8,335,264
  Total  23,084  3,582,027  748,594  4,668,942  612,618,867
Source:  Adapted from Meherka (2008).




Table 2.4  Household participation in cooperatives among smallholder 
farmers in Ethiopia
     Smallholders
  Smallholders  Smallholders  participating when they
  participating in  with a cooperative    have a cooperative
  a cooperative  in their kebele in  their kebele
 Percentage    Percentage    Percentage
 of    of    of
Region households  Differencea households Differencea households Differencea
Ethiopia  9.14 — 39.59 — 16.87 —
Tigray  20.40 0.0057 87.99 0.0000 20.93 0.3511
Amhara  14.48 0.0630 46.34 0.0000 24.29 0.1362
Oromia  7.35 0.3026 42.54 0.0046 12.18 0.1446
SNNP  3.69 0.0000 18.49 0.0000  8.96 0.0391
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).
Notes:   — means not applicable; SNNP means Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples regional 
state. A kebele is a peasant association, the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia.
aTest of difference from national average: probability > F.is explained by the expansion of cooperatives in Tigray, where cooperative 
prevalence grew from 12 to 83 percent during 1991–2005. As of 2007, there 
were more than 23,000 primary cooperatives in Ethiopia, with membership 
totaling more than 4.6 million (Table 2.3). These figures, however, include 
urban as well as rural cooperatives.
  In Table 2.4, we use data from the ESCS (2005) survey to investigate the 
actual prevalence of agricultural cooperatives in rural areas; we show the  per-
centage of households participating in at least one cooperative involved in 
agriculture. As indicated in column 1, only 9 percent of all farm households 
report participating in a cooperative at a national level. We also note signifi-
cant differences in membership rates across regions: 20 percent of the small-
holders in Tigray region participate in cooperatives, whereas less than 4  percent
of people in the SNNP region participate. Part of this variation is driven by
differences in the level of access to cooperatives. Thus, as reported in col-
umn 3 of the table, 88 percent of smallholders in Tigray have at least one coop-
erative in their kebele, compared to less than 20 percent in SNNP. However, 
even when there is an organization in their kebele, smallholders in SNNP are still 
less likely to participate in cooperatives: only 9 percent participate—below the 
national average of 17 percent (column 5 in the table).
Descriptions of Agricultural Cooperatives in Ethiopia: 
Data and Narratives
Boxes 2.1 and 2.2 describe two agriculture marketing cooperatives encoun-
tered during fieldwork. They are characteristic of the diversity and hetero-
geneity found among cooperatives in Ethiopia and help to illustrate some of 
the issues being raised in this study. Table 2.5 shows that Ethiopian coopera-
tives are engaged in a vast array of activities. Multipurpose and savings and 
credit cooperatives are the most prevalent, followed by housing and small/
medium enterprise cooperatives. (Note, however, that these figures include 
both rural and urban cooperatives; the vast majority of housing and small/
medium enterprise cooperatives are urban.) From these figures, one can 
estimate that about one-third to half of the cooperatives in the country are 
directly involved with agriculture.
  Focusing on those cooperatives with an agricultural emphasis, we use the 
ECS (2006) data to provide average characteristics of grain-marketing coop-
eratives in the four main regions of the country (Table 2.6). These organiza-
tions are rather large, with average membership close to 1,000 (ranging from 
21 to 3,664 members). Land cultivated per member averages 1.75 hectares, 
a figure that is consistent with the notion that cooperative members are 
largely smallholders, although not necessarily the smallest, as the average 
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Box 2.1  Amecha Area Multipurpose Cooperative
The Amecha Area Multipurpose Cooperative is located 17 kilometers from 
Wolenchiti, the capital of the food-insecure woreda of Boset. Founded 
in 1980 under the Derg regime, its activities were then limited to col-
lecting farmers’ produce for the Agricultural Marketing Corporation of 
the government at below-market prices. The organization was there-
fore considered exploitative of farmers and was dismantled with the 
fall of the regime in 1991.
  The Cooperative was re-established in 1995 with the objective of 
providing members with output marketing services as well as enhanced 
access to agricultural inputs and credit. This time, however, the organi-
zation was meant to be free of any external control and to be governed 
democratically in accordance with the interests of the members. At 
present, the Cooperative’s contacts with the administration are limited 
to management training, market information, and audit services pro-
vided by the Woreda Cooperative Office. In return, the Cooperative is 
obligated to present its audited financial report annually to the Zonal 
Cooperative Office.
  At the time of the Cooperative’s re-establishment, it was also made 
clear that membership should be voluntary, in contrast with forced par-
ticipation under the previous regime. As of today, membership is open 
to anyone, provided they accept and respect the Cooperative’s bylaws, 
understand and accept its objectives, and pay 67 birr (1 birr as a regis-
tration fee and 66 birr as the price of a share). The Cooperative today 
counts 984 members, mostly elderly people. Younger individuals typically 
do not control land and are thus less interested in the services offered; 
moreover, the organization is often still perceived as a government entity 
similar to the cooperatives under the Derg regime rather than a farmer-
owned organization.
  Currently, the Cooperative is only involved in input supply and crop 
purchase. It receives agricultural inputs (fertilizer and credit) from the 
Lume-Adama-Boset Union and sells to members and nonmembers (but 
only members may purchase on credit). In marketing members’ output, 
the Cooperative gives priority to the Union, provided the prices offered 
are competitive with the nearby markets of Nazareth and Wolenchiti. 
Nonmembers may also sell their products through the Cooperative, but 
they do not benefit from the proceeds of the organization. (Dividends 
have been distributed twice to members since the re-establishment.)ETHIOPIAN COOPERATIVES  23   
  The main constraint faced by the Cooperative is the dearth of appro-
priate financial resources. Because of the lack of appropriate storage 
and transportation, the organization is forced to sell outputs in May 
instead of waiting for higher prices in September. Although there are 
several potential partners operating in the woreda (such as the Rural 
Financial Intermediation Program and World Vision, an international 
NGO), the Cooperative has not yet been able to secure credit to invest 
in needed equipment.
Source:   Key informant interviews conducted by the authors as part of ECS (2006).
Box 2.2  Awara Cooperative
The Awara Cooperative is located 8 kilometers from Aje, capital of the 
remote woreda of Siraro. The organization was created in February 2005
to help farmers get timely access to seeds and fertilizers. The organi-
zation significantly benefited from initial help from the woreda office 
of the regional BoCP, which gave members training on the importance 
of cooperatives in helping smallholders. Immediately after its establish-
ment, the Cooperative received 127 quintals of fertilizer on credit from 
the woreda office of the BoARD.
  The organization also aims to provide marketing services to its mem-
bers, buying from them at higher-than-market prices after the harvest 
and selling on the market when prices are more favorable. Safe storage 
is ensured through renting appropriate local warehouse facilities (1,000 
birr per year for 214 quintals of maize). Price information is collected 
on the nearby markets of Shashemene and Aje through an informal net-
work of individual traders who are known to the members. In 2005 the 
Cooperative purchased maize from its members at 105 birr per quintal 
at a time when the market price was 100 birr per quintal.
  Members are not forced to supply all their produce to the Coopera-
tive; in the future, however, dividends will be paid according to the 
volume of grain supplied. To date, nonmembers have not been permit-
ted to sell their produce to the Cooperative; this should change once the 
organization’s financial capacity is stronger.
  Membership in the Cooperative is open to anyone, provided he or 
she is free of debt and can reliably repay a loan. Initially the registra-tion fee was 25 birr and a share cost 100 birr. Today new members must 
also contribute a quintal of maize to strengthen the financial capacity 
of the Cooperative. There are now 130 members in all. Reasons for not 
joining the organization include the high level of entrance fees, the mis-
taken identification of the Cooperative with previous Derg organiza-
tions, and suspicions of corruption in the Cooperative management.
 The  woreda office of the BoCP offers continuous support to the 
Awara Cooperative, as does the Negele-Shashemene-Siraro Cooperative 
Union, which monitors and controls the Cooperative and, in particular, 
its management procedures. The main bottleneck to the organization’s 
development is its lack of access to credit; a request was filed with the 
woreda office of the BoCP, but the loan was refused. Other constraints 
include the lack of information and marketing links in potentially lucra-
tive markets, such as Addis Ababa.
  One-quarter of the profit of the Cooperative is retained to fund 
its further development. Plans include providing greater quantities of 
improved seeds and fertilizers to members, opening shops in the town 
of Aje, developing marketing links to larger markets, providing oxen for
those who lack one, and purchasing grain from the market to sell when 
prices rise.
Source:   Key informant interviews conducted by the authors as part of ECS (2006).























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.26  CHAPTER 2
landholding in Ethiopia is 0.8 hectares. Most of the cooperatives were created 
or re-established (following the downfall of the Derg in 1991) within the past 
10 years. About 59 percent of the cooperatives surveyed stated that they
had received significant help from external partners at the time of their
(re)establishment; in 80 percent of these cases, this help came from the 
government. About 20 percent of the cooperatives surveyed stated that they 
had received significant financial help at the time of their (re)establishment, 
also primarily from the government. And about 74 percent of these marketing 
cooperatives were also engaged in providing social services to their members.
Table 2.6  Grain-marketing cooperatives in Ethiopia, 
descriptive statistics
     25th  75th
Cooperative     percentile  percentile
characteristic Unit/Description  Mean  value  value
Membership  Number of members   942.23  335  1,290
    in 2005 
Aggregated product  Total hectares   1,541.45  397.50  2,207.50
    cultivated by 
    members 
Holdings per member  Hectare  1.75  0.85  2.43
Age of cooperative  Year  8.18  3.00  14.00
Partner at origin  1 = received external  59.30%  0  1 
    help at creation 
Financial help at origin  1 = received financial   20.34%  0  0
    help at creation 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from ECS (2006).
Note:  Characteristics based on a sample of 172 cooperatives surveyed in 2006.CHAPTER 3
Impact of Cooperatives on Members’ 
Commercialization
C
an cooperatives secure greater benefits of commercialization for 
smallholder farmers? We use household-level data from the ESCS (2005) 
to compare the actual extent of commercialization of cooperative 
members against their likely level had they not participated in such an orga-
nization. Care is taken to minimize biases caused by the nonrandom location 
of cooperatives and the nonrandom selection of members, as described in 
detail below.
Identification Strategy
Our empirical strategy aims to overcome three potential sources of biases. 
First, participants may significantly differ from nonparticipants in commu-
nity- and household-level observable characteristics that may have a direct 
effect on commercialization (such as geographic remoteness, or a house-
hold’s physical and human capital stock). As a result, the observed differ-
ences between members and nonmembers may, either totally or partially, 
reflect initial differences between them rather than the effects of coopera-
tive membership.
  Second, such selection bias may also result from unobservable community 
or household characteristics. At the community level, for instance, it may be 
that the existence of a cooperative is in part driven by particularly dynamic 
local leaders. At the member level, a household’s risk preference, its entre-
preneurial spirit, or its relationship with other cooperative members may 
significantly influence behavior.
  Such biases are most often accounted for using an instrumental variables 
approach. However, instrumental variable methods are of limited help in the 
presence of a third source of bias: local general equilibrium effects, as would 
occur (for example) if the presence of a cooperative (the treatment) signifi-
cantly affects the relevant outcome even for nonmembers (the nontreated), 
through externalities or spillover effects.
27  This third source of bias can arise from the likely externalities exerted 
by cooperatives on the commercialization capacities and choices of non-
members. For instance, cooperatives may significantly affect the price offered
by local traders to cooperative nonmembers. This effect is likely to be enhanced 
if nonmembers have the option of using cooperatives as an outlet for their 
output.
  To minimize these biases, we employ propensity score matching tech-
niques, extensively used in the recent literature on economic impact evalu-
ation (Jalan and Ravallion 2003a). Relevant applications of these techniques 
include impact assessments of farmers’ field schools (Gotland et al. 2004), 
community-driven development (Rao and Ibanez 2003), pipe water (Jalan and 
Ravallion 2003b), and road rehabilitation (Van de Walle and Cratty 2002). 
Specifically, our approach involves a two-step matching estimator. First, 
kebeles with cooperatives are matched to similar kebeles without coopera-
tives, on the basis of marketing-relevant characteristics, such as remoteness, 
agricultural potential, and population density. In a second step, we match 
cooperative members to similar households living in kebeles without coop-
eratives. The matching is based on a unique variable, the propensity score, 
defined as the probability that a given household would participate in a coop-
erative, given a set of observable characteristics.1
  Overall, controlling for the households’ observable characteristics mini-
mizes the incidence of the first bias described above. Furthermore, because 
our strategy compares cooperative members to similar households located in 
other kebeles, it is also likely that the third bias is also limited. We are there-
fore left with the second source of bias, namely, the effect of nonobservable 
characteristics influencing both the presence of cooperatives in particular 
kebeles and households’ decisions to participate.
  In Ethiopia, however, most cooperatives were initiated under the influ-
ence of an external partner (see Table 2.6). According to data from the ECS
(2006), 63 percent of the agricultural marketing cooperatives were created 
by government institutions, 11 percent by a donor agency or NGO, and only
26 percent by members themselves. Dropping from our sample those kebeles
in which cooperatives were member-created, we assume that the establish-
ment of cooperatives is exogenous to communities’ unobservable characteris-
tics as well as to that of their members. Indeed, it became clear from several 
discussions with woreda-level cooperative promotion officers that encourage-
ment for the creation of cooperatives mostly follows a top-down approach. 
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1 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that households with similar propensity scores also have 
similar distributions of covariates.In other words, kebeles with cooperatives created by government institutions 
do not self-select but instead are externally selected by the cooperative 
promotion agents. It was also clear from discussions with the agents from the 
FCA that no clear directions were given to woreda-level offices as to how to 
select kebeles to be targeted first. Overall, controlling for relevant observ-
able characteristics appears sufficient to ensure comparability of kebeles 
with and kebeles without cooperatives.
  Furthermore, because in this sample the existence of a cooperative is 
assumed independent of its members’ characteristics, there is no a priori 
reason to believe that the distribution of household-level unobservable char-
acteristics systematically differs across kebeles that share similar observable 
characteristics. It follows that differences in unobservable characteristics 
between cooperative members and households with similar propensity scores 
(but living in kebeles without cooperatives) may be considered here as ran-
dom and will not bias the estimator.2
  Finally, to further ensure the validity of such an approach, one must verify 
that treatment and comparison households are operating in the same mar-
kets (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1998). In the present case, however, this 
requirement has to be tempered by the need to minimize spillover effects 
within markets, from kebeles with cooperatives to those without. We address 
this double requirement with three arguments:
1.   Our matching procedure ensures that sample kebeles are sufficiently similar 
by taking into account important determinants of price, such as remote-
ness, agro-ecological potential, and population density.
2.   Cooperatives may generate spillover effects that are particularly strong 
at the local market level; by ensuring that treatment and comparison 
kebeles are linked to different local markets, we ensure that the likeli-
hood of spillover effects is minimized.
3.   An extensive literature has shown the important increase in grain-market 
integration in Ethiopia (Dercon 1995; Jayne, Negassa, and Myers 1998; 
Negassa 1998; World Bank 2006; Negassa and Myers 2007)—and in particu-
lar in the three regions considered in our final sample (Rashid, Gabre-
Madhin, and Getnet 2007). Grain-market integration ensures that treatment 
and comparison kebeles are indeed exposed to similar market conditions. 
In any case, the operation of cooperatives is unlikely to significantly affect 
regional prices: as of 2005, less than 10 percent of agricultural output 
marketed in the country passed through cooperatives (FCA 2005).
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2 The greater the number of kebeles considered, the more likely this assumption will hold.Matching
Matching Kebeles
Among the 293 kebeles in the sample, 94 had at least one cooperative at 
the time of the survey. However, not all of them satisfy the identification 
assumption that the present spatial distribution of cooperatives is exogenous. 
Specifically, this assumption may not hold for kebeles with member-created 
cooperatives; such kebeles were therefore removed from our sample. In addi-
tion, in some kebeles without cooperatives, it was reported that households 
had access to one in a nearby kebele. To further add to the robustness of our 
estimates, these kebeles were also removed from the sample. The remaining 
sample consists of 68 treatment kebeles, where at least one cooperative can 
be found, and 134 comparison kebeles where no cooperatives exist.
  The next step is to ensure that the treatment kebeles are sufficiently 
similar to the comparison ones. To do so, we apply the notion of develop-
ment domains, as adapted to Ethiopia by Chamberlin, Pender, and Yu (2006). 
Development domains are defined as geographic locations sharing broadly 
similar rural development constraints and opportunities. The classification is 
based on four characteristics that best capture livelihood heterogeneity among 
smallholders in Ethiopia: altitude, population density, distance to the closest 
market, and moisture reliability. Their aggregation is based on thresholds spe-
cifically established to maximize the predictive power of the domains.3
  In our sample, kebeles can be classified into 22 different domains. To test 
the validity of these domains as predictors for the existence of externally 
created cooperatives, we use a probit estimation, where the dependent vari-
able is the existence or absence of a cooperative and the independent variables 
are dummy variables for each of the domains. Overall, this test performs 
relatively well: domains successfully predict 70 percent of the incidence of 
cooperatives.
  Next, according to our matching procedure, we need to ensure that a suf-
ficient number of treatment and comparison kebeles exist in each domain. 
The distribution is reported in Table 3.1, showing that five domains (1, 2, 5, 
12, and 15) capture more than 70 percent of the kebeles with at least one 
externally created cooperative, while the remaining 30 percent are dispersed 
among 12 of the remaining 17 domains. It appears that each of the five pre-
dominant domains includes enough comparison kebeles to perform the analy-
sis. Finally, although selective, these five domains are quite heterogeneous: 
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3 Whereas Chamberlin, Pender, and Yu (2006) conduct the necessary computation at the woreda 
level, the present analysis is based on the analogous computation at the kebele level.IMPACT ON COMMERCIALIZATION  31   
Table 3.1  Treatment and comparison kebeles, by development domains
   Percentage  Percentage
Domain    of comparison  of treatment
number Domain  kebeles   kebeles
 1  Highland, moisture reliable, high market   8.21  13.24
    access, high population density 
 2  Highland, moisture reliable, high market   23.13  20.59
    access, medium population density 
 3  Highland, moisture reliable, high market   2.24  4.41
    access, low population density 
 4  Highland, moisture reliable, low market access,   4.48  0.00
    high population density 
 5  Highland, moisture reliable, low market access,   19.40  10.29
    medium population density 
 6  Highland, moisture reliable, low market access,   2.99  0.00
    low population density 
 7  Lowland, moisture reliable, high market access,   3.73  1.47
    medium population density 
 8  Lowland, moisture reliable, high market access,   0.75  0.00
    low population density 
 9  Lowland, moisture reliable, low market access,   1.49  2.94
    medium population density 
10  Lowland, moisture reliable, low market access,   5.22  0.00
    low population density 
11  Highland, drought prone, high market access,   1.49  1.47
    high population density 
12  Highland, drought prone, high market access,   2.99  13.24
    medium population density 
13  Highland, drought prone, high market access,   1.49  1.47
    low population density 
14  Highland, drought prone, low market access,   1.49  1.47
    high population density 
15  Highland, drought prone, low market access,   2.99  14.71
    medium population density 
16  Highland, drought prone, low market access,   2.24  2.94
    low population density 
17  Lowland, drought prone, high market access,   1.49  0.00
    high population density 
18  Lowland, drought prone, high market access,   0.75  2.94
    medium population density 
19  Lowland, drought prone, high market access,   2.99  1.47
    low population density 
20  Lowland, drought prone, low market access,   2.24  2.94
    medium population density 
21  Lowland, drought prone, low market access,   5.22  2.94
    low population density 
22  Lowland, pastoralist, high market access, low  2.99  1.47
    population density 
    Total  100.00  100.00
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).
Notes:   A kebele is a peasant association, the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia. The data 
for comparison kebeles are based on 134 observations; the data for treatment kebeles 
are based on 68 observations.some domains are highland moisture-reliable domains (1, 2, and 5), whereas 
the others are highland, drought-prone domains (12 and 15); some have high 
market access (1 and 2), whereas the others are more remote (5 and 12); 
most have medium population densities (2, 5, 12, and 15), but one is more 
densely populated (1). Accordingly, we further refine our sample by focusing 
on treatment and comparison kebeles falling within these five development 
domains.
  To further check the sample’s validity, we present in Table 3.2 the dis-
tribution of treatment and comparison kebeles across the administrative 
regions of Ethiopia. Indeed, as described in Chapter 2, regional coopera-
tive offices can play an important role in the promotion and organization of 
cooperatives through directives passed down to woreda cooperative offices. 
Consequently, there are important differences at the regional level that need 
to be accounted for. As shown in Table 3.2, only three regions—Amhara, Oro-
mia, and SNNP—exhibit a relatively balanced subsample between treatment 
and comparison kebeles. In contrast, the Tigray subsample contains only one 
kebele without a cooperative in 2005, and the subsamples in Beneshangul-
Gumuz and Harari have a total membership of one kebele each. Hence, it 
may be necessary to further limit the sample to include only the Amhara, 
Oromia, and SNNP regions to ensure better comparability of treatment and 
comparison observations.
  Table 3.3 reports a series of balancing tests for both samples—one that 
includes all regions and one that excludes Tigray, Beneshangul-Gumuz, and 
Harari—to ascertain the significance of these comparability concerns. Results 
indicate that the sample containing all regions performs poorly: a significant 
difference between treatment and comparison kebeles is found in 5 of the 13 
tests performed. By comparison, the sample restricted to Amhara, Oromia, 
and SNNP performs better: the kebeles are on average similar in all dimen-
sions covered by these tests. We thus reject the suitability of the full sample 
and restrict ourselves to the subsample consisting of three regions that 
includes 35 treatment and 73 comparison kebeles.
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Table 3.2  Number of treatment and comparison kebeles, by region
Kebele       Beneshangul-
category Tigray  Amhara  Oromia  Gumuz  SNNP  Harari  Total
Comparison 1  18  33  1  22  1  76
Treatment 14  9  20  0  6  0  49
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).
Notes:   SNNP means Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples regional state. A kebele is a 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.  One last validity check is undertaken to ensure that treatment and com-
parison kebeles correspond to sufficiently close locations. Figure 3.1 shows the 
geographic location of each kebele in our subsample against a shaded back-
ground that indicates the level of market access based on the development 
domain calculations. We find that (1) treatment and comparison groups are 
geographically mixed, thereby ensuring that the impact of cooperatives will not 
be driven by area-specific characteristics; and (2) the distribution of treatment 
and comparison kebeles by level of market access is also fairly balanced.
Matching Households
As a result of the sample reduction, the subsample now contains 2,532 house-
holds, including 1,702 in comparison kebeles and 830 in treatment kebeles; 
150 are cooperative members (Table 3.4). Propensity scores are used to 
match the 150 household members in the treatment kebeles—the treated 
households—to those households among the 1,702 in the comparison kebeles 
that most resemble them. For this purpose, we first estimate each house-
hold’s propensity score (its likelihood of joining a cooperative in the treat-
ment kebeles) using a flexible probit model where the dependent variable 







Figure 3.1  Geographic location of treatment and comparison kebelesis the household’s membership status. Domain dummies are used to ensure 
matching within the domains. Household characteristics include measures of 
the household’s assets (such as education level, radio ownership, nonfarm 
income, landholding, and livestock) that are introduced linearly as well as 
quadratically to augment the model’s predictive power. Finally, a set of 
dummy variables is included to account for the household’s cultivation of 
particular cereal crops.4
  We must also consider that a household’s production of a particular cereal 
may be in response to participation in the cooperative. The estimated impact 
would then be downward biased, as it might not take into account a house-
hold’s switch into production of higher profit crops. However, the focus of 
the present monograph is the cooperatives’ impact on smallholders’ market-
ing behavior. As such, one wants to compare marketing behavior of house-
holds engaged in similar production, regardless of whether this was driven by 
the cooperative. In addition, the production of particular cereals is largely 
driven by soil and weather conditions in Ethiopia: teff is mainly cultivated 
in highland areas north of Addis Ababa, maize in the lowlands south of Addis 
Ababa, sorghum in the northwest and east, and barley along a north-south 
meridian in the middle of the country (CSA, EDRI, and IFPRI 2006).
  The probit estimation is better identified when undertaken on treatment 
kebeles only, where the choice to join a cooperative exists (see Gotland et al. 
2004 for a discussion). We report estimates of the coefficients in Table 3.5. 
We also report the associated p-values, although the purpose here is not to 
identify particular relationships but rather to maximize the predictive power 
of the model. Such an approach relies on out-of-sample prediction to gener-
ate a propensity score for the comparison households, however. To assess 
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Table 3.4  Distribution of households across treatment and 
comparison kebeles
 Comparison  Treatment
Household type  kebeles  kebeles  Total
Cooperative nonmembers  1,702  680  2,382
Cooperative members  0  150  150
  Total  1,702  830  2,532
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).
Note:   A kebele is a peasant association, the smallest administrative unit in 
Ethiopia.
4 All households in this sample are involved in cereal production.36  CHAPTER 3
Table 3.5  Probit estimations of determinants of participation 
in cooperatives
  Sample 1: members   Sample 2: members and 
  and nonmembers   nonmembers from
 from  kebeles    kebeles with and 
  with cooperatives  without cooperatives
Determinant Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value
Age of household head  0.009  0.028  0.009  0.003
Gender of household head  –0.579 0.002  –0.311 0.038
Household head is literate  –0.003 0.978 0.066  0.539
Household  size  0.082 0.513 0.142  0.129
(Household size)2  –0.006 0.562  –0.010 0.161
Radio  ownership  0.005 0.970 0.064  0.549
Household receives nonfarm   –0.166 0.190  –0.216 0.027
  income 
Number of hectares held  0.551  0.000  0.380  0.000
(Number of hectares held)2  –0.053 0.025  –0.033 0.038
Number of oxen owned  0.061  0.656  0.128  0.161
(Number of oxen owned)2  –0.001 0.978  –0.007 0.616
Number of cattle owned  0.022  0.632  –0.017 0.630
(Number of cattle owned)2  –0.002 0.425 0.001  0.877
Number of small ruminants  0.051  0.051  0.036  0.072 
  owned 
(Number of small ruminants   –0.001 0.498  –0.001 0.455
  owned)2 
Number of poultry owned  0.029  0.378  0.026  0.310
(Number of poultry owned)2  –0.001 0.367  –0.001 0.627
Produces  teff  0.134 0.326 0.245  0.020
Produces  wheat  0.060 0.703 0.055  0.607
Produces maize  –0.333 0.028  –0.251 0.026
Produces barley  –0.629 0.000  –0.699 0.000
Produces sorghum  –0.159 0.264  –0.315 0.003
Produces oats  –0.403 0.389  –0.204 0.579
Produces millet  –0.524 0.033  –0.319 0.111
Development domain   Yes  —  Yes  —
  dummies (5–1)a 
Constant  –2.658 0.000  –1.906 0.000
  Number of observations    830    2,532
  Pseudo R2   0.2444    0.2130
  Correct prediction rate (%)  84.45    94.43
  Correct prediction rate   32.66    7.33
    among participants (%) 
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).
Notes:   — means not applicable. A kebele is a peasant association, the smallest administrative 
unit in Ethiopia.
a(5–1) denotes the five development domains that capture the majority of cooperatives.the importance of associated concerns, we also report estimates from the 
same model applied to the entire sample. Overall, parameter estimates and 
their statistical significance are similar, except for variables linked to non-
farm income and type of cereals production, which may well be influenced 
by kebele-level characteristics. We find, however, that estimates based on 
the restricted sample are better able to predict the rare event (membership 
in cooperatives) than those based on the full sample. We therefore use the 
restricted sample to generate propensity scores for households living in com-
parison kebeles, determining which ones would probably participate, given 
access to a cooperative.
  The distribution of propensity scores among the treatment and compari-
son groups are reported in Figure 3.2. As is clear from the figure, the distri-
butions appear quite different, so that matching techniques will be necessary 
to ensure the robustness of our estimates. Several techniques can be used. 
Here we focus on two broadly used methods: (1) nonparametric kernel regres-
sion matching proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998); and (2) 
five-nearest-neighbors matching. In the first case, each treated household is 
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Figure 3.2  Propensity-score distribution among treatment and 
comparison observations
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).
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.matched with the entire sample of comparisons. However, each comparison 
observation enters the estimate with a weight inversely proportional to its 
distance to the treatment one, based on the propensity score distribution. In 
the second method, each treatment observation is matched with the average 
value of its five nearest comparison neighbors, again based on the propensity 
score distribution. To ensure maximum comparability of the treatment and 
comparison groups, the sample is restricted to the common support region, 
defined as the interval of propensity score values where both treatment and 
comparison observations can be found.
  A straightforward way to test the validity of the matching procedure is to 
compare an average household’s characteristics in the treatment sample to 
the corresponding characteristics of the comparison group generated. Accord-
ingly, the absence of significant differences between the treatment and com-
parison groups is indicative of a valid matching. We thus undertake a series 
of statistical tests for differences in household characteristics on three differ-
ent samples: (1) cooperative members in treatment kebeles compared to all 
households in the comparison kebeles (an unmatched sample); (2) cooperative 
members in treatment kebeles compared to the subset of households satisfying 
the common support restriction in the comparison kebeles, with kernel-based 
matching; and (3) cooperative members in treatment kebeles compared to the 
subset of households satisfying the common support restriction in the compari-
son kebeles, selected through the five-nearest-neighbors matching method.
  As shown in Table 3.6, the unmatched sample fails to satisfy the balanc-
ing properties: households in treatment kebeles are on average significantly 
different from the households in the comparison kebeles in all but one of 
the aspects considered. By comparison, only one such significant difference 
is observed in the matched samples, that is, the number of ruminants owned 
by the household. Overall, these results suggest that the two matched sam-




We assess the impact of cooperatives on smallholders’ commercialization 
using two related indicators. The first one captures the extent to which 
cooperatives provide smallholders with better market conditions in the form 
of higher output prices. The second one measures smallholders’ actual mar-
keting response to cooperative membership, as reflected in the percentage 
of output being commercialized.
IMPACT ON COMMERCIALIZATION  39     The impact of cooperatives on output prices is intended to capture whether 
cooperatives effectively enable their members to obtain a higher price for their 
output. This indicator is fundamental, because policies promoting coopera-
tives often highlight, as a rationale, the possibility that such organizations can 
help smallholders obtain higher prices for their output through reduced trans-
action costs, increased bargaining power vis-à-vis traders, or the ability to 
reach more attractive markets. The price indicator that we use is an acreage-
share weighted sum, over all types of cereal sold, of the difference between 
the price received by the member household and the corresponding average 
price in the sample:
  pij – p –
j
PDi = Σlij × (—————— × 100),
 j   p –
j
where PDi is the price indicator for household i, lij is the proportion of land that 
is allocated to cereal j by household i in 2005, pij is the unit price received
by household i for crop j, and p –
j is the average unit price of crop j received by
the sample households.5
  The second indicator aims to capture whether smallholders’ participation 
in marketing cooperatives leads to more market-oriented behavior. We use the 
share of the cereal output that was sold by a household in 2005, denoted PS, 
and defined as:
  Sij
  PSi = Σ  — ——,
  j  Qij
where Qij is the quantity of crop j that was produced by household i and Sij 
is the quantity of crop j that was sold by household i, both in 2005. If coop-
eratives are able to enhance market participation, then their impact on this 
indicator will be positive.
Estimators
Because the impact estimates may be sensitive to the estimator chosen, 
we use two separate classes of estimators to assess the robustness of our 
results. In the first one, we simply compute the difference in outcome between 
treatment and comparison households that are matched according to the 
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5 The aggregation process across crops is meant to capture the effects of the household’s crop 
production profile.two procedures described above. Because analytical standard errors are not 
computable for the kernel density matching method, we use 100 bootstrap 
replications stratified at the development domain level to compute robust 
estimates of them. The second estimator is based on ordinary least squares 
and tobit estimations, including several control variables. To further ensure 
comparability of the treatment and comparison groups, we restrict the sam-
ple to the common support region of the five-nearest-neighbors matching, as 
described above.
Results: Average Impact of Cooperatives on Their Members
Panel A of Table 3.7 gives the nonparametric estimates of the average treat-
ment effect on the treated—that is, the mean impact that cooperative mem-
bership has had on members’ output commercialization and price. Starting 
with the price difference indicator, we find that, on average, cooperative 
members receive between 7.2 and 8.9 percent higher prices for their cereal 
products than did their nonmember counterparts. This effect is statistically 
significant and robust across both matching techniques; it is consistent with 
the idea that cooperatives may increase the returns to commercialization 
for smallholder farmers. Regarding the share of production sold, however, 
we find that cooperative membership does not have an impact significantly 
different from zero.
  The implication of these results appears surprising: despite a higher aver-
age price received for their outputs, cooperative members apparently do 
not tend to supply more of their output to the market. Two types of biases 
may be at play, however. First, the obtained estimates may be influenced 
by the estimation procedures adopted and the indicators used. Second, given 
the reduction in the size of the sample, the estimates obtained may lack 
representativeness of the general situation in Ethiopia. To account for these 
sources of bias, we present in panels B and C of Table 3.7 a series of robust-
ness and representativeness checks.
  For instance, one may argue that the use of the sample average as the 
reference point in the price indicator is problematic. Although our estima-
tions control for important determinants of output prices via the develop-
ment domains, it could still be the case that, if cooperatives are located in 
areas with higher prices to start with, a higher price for cooperative members 
may wrongly be attributed to the presence of cooperatives instead of to local 
conditions. To avoid such biases, using zonal or regional level aggregates 
as the reference point instead of the entire sample might be recommended. 
In this case, however, the relatively small size of our sample at the zonal 
level as well as in some regions would provide us with imprecise estimates 
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Table 3.7  Effect of cooperatives on members’ cereals 
commercialization
 Kernel-based  Five-nearest-
 matching  neighbors  matching
   Standard  Standard  Number  of
  ATT error ATT error  observations
Measure
A. Two-step matching, final sample
  Price difference (%)  7.249  3.229**  8.901  4.361**  862
  Production sold (%)  –0.122 1.862  –1.116 2.202  1,817
B. Checks of robustness
  B-1. Two-step matching, final sample limited to Oromia region only
  Price difference (%)  8.545  3.952**  7.141  6.373  454
  Production sold (%)  –2.881 3.671  –2.914 3.141  787
  B-2. Two-step matching, final sample excluding kebeles with NGO-created cooperatives
  Price difference (%)  5.567  3.674  6.196  4.366  861
  Production sold (%)  0.761  1.876  –1.402 2.442  1,805
  B-3. Two-step matching, final sample, with propensity scores estimated on whole sample
  Price difference (%)  7.206  3.229**  7.562  3.771**  862
  Production sold (%)  –1.180 1.964  –3.224 2.550  1,817
C. Checks of representativeness
  C-1. Two-step matching, sample with all regions
  Price difference (%)  11.451  2.060***  10.607  2.765***  1,449
  Production sold (%)  –1.174 1.147  –0.944 1.340  2,993
  C-2. Two-step matching, sample with member-created cooperatives
  Price difference (%)  9.294  1.831***  8.626  2.327***  1,471
  Production sold (%)  0.005  1.07  –0.084 1.325  2,972
  C-3. Two-step matching, sample with all regions and member-created cooperatives
  Price difference (%)  13.120  1.923***  12.118  2.206***  1,504
  Production sold (%)  –1.380 0.923  –1.295 1.093  3,105
  C-4. One-step matching, final sample within treatment kebeles only
  Price difference (%)  7.606  3.980*  7.259  3.571**  368
  Production sold (%)  –1.083 1.811  –1.410 2.135  822
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).
Notes:   Stratified bootstrap with 100 replications is used to estimate the standard errors. 
Numbers are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, 
respectively. ATT means average treatment effect on the treated; NGO means non-
governmental organization. A kebele is a peasant association, the smallest admini-
strative unit in Ethiopia.of the mean price, which in turn may severely affect the precision of our 
estimates. To test the importance of such potential bias, we compute the 
average treatment effects when only the Oromia region is considered in 
the analysis. (As shown in Table 3.2, Oromia is the only region where a suf-
ficiently large sample of treatment and comparison kebeles exist.) Results 
reported in panel B-1, although less precise, are qualitatively similar to those 
of panel A.
  Second, we investigate whether the inclusion of NGO-created coopera-
tives in the final sample may affect the results. Indeed, if NGOs deliberately 
choose the kebeles in which they intervene based on criteria linked to the 
likely performance of the organizations they help set up, results may be 
artificially high. In panel B-2, we present estimates from a sample excluding 
kebeles where NGO-created cooperatives exist. The estimates are reduced in 
their magnitude and precision, although the main features remain.
  Third, we check whether our use of the sample of kebeles with coopera-
tives only, to derive the propensity score estimates, may have affected the 
results. Results are reported in panel B-3; they do not show any meaningful 
differences from those of panel A.
  Next we investigate how the estimates may be affected by more represen-
tative but arguably more biased samples. A first concern may come from our 
limitation to cereal crop cooperatives, when evidence suggests that coopera-
tives are often more efficient when operating with high-value products, such 
as coffee. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, cereals do, however, constitute 
the most important crops for smallholders’ livelihood in many Sub-Saharan 
African countries, particularly in Ethiopia.
  Further, in panel C-1, we use a sample containing all regions, including 
Tigray, Beneshangul-Gumuz, and Harari. Again, the results do not clearly differ 
from those of panel A, although the impact of cooperatives on output prices 
seems greater in magnitude than for the fully restricted sample. The same 
conclusions are drawn from panels C-2 and C-3, where the sample includes 
all kebeles with member-created cooperatives, first restricted to only three 
regions (Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP) and then extended to cover all regions. 
Finally, in panel C-4, results are based on the sample of panel A but are 
further restricted to only kebeles where an externally created cooperative 
exists. The comparison is then done between cooperative members and 
nonmembers living in the same kebeles. Again, the results do not change in 
nature.
  Another robustness check uses parametric estimations that control for 
several household- and community-level characteristics (Table 3.8). Because 
participation in a cooperative may directly affect the production levels of 
IMPACT ON COMMERCIALIZATION  43   members, we use the number of hectares of farm land “owned” by the 
household as a proxy for its actual level of production. Given the land own-
ership regime in Ethiopia, this variable is considered as exogenous, at least 
in the short or medium term.6 Other variables in the estimation include the 
household head’s reading ability, household size, and the set of kebele-level 
control variables used in the definition of the development domains. The 
sample is the same as that used in the estimates reported in panel A of Table 
3.7, except that a few observations with missing data were dropped. Estima-
tors used are the ordinary least squares and tobit specifications described 
above.
  Coefficients in the upper part of Table 3.8 indicate that households living 
close to markets sell more of their production and at higher prices, whereas 
the opposite is true for households living in areas with higher population 
densities. Favorable agroclimatic conditions (that is, areas that produce sur-
pluses) tend to have depressing effects on prices. From among the household-
level characteristics, the amount of land owned positively affects the share 
of production that is commercialized by a household, and the education 
of the household head has a clear and significant effect on the price he or 
she is able to obtain for a unit of output. In the middle part of the table, 
we report the coefficients on a membership dummy (“Treatment ×”). Coop-
erative membership does have a significant positive impact on output price, 
similar in magnitude to the results presented in Table 3.7. In contrast, the 
effect on the share of production sold cannot be distinguished from zero, 
further supporting the conclusions of the previous table.
  Overall, the robustness and representativeness checks support the general 
conclusion that, although cooperatives may provide significantly higher prices 
to their members, the average impact on fraction of output marketed is not 
statistically different from zero. However, these estimates capture average 
outcomes and do not capture potentially important heterogeneities across 
farmers’ responses to their participation in cooperatives.
Heterogeneous Impact
There is no reason to believe a priori that membership in a cooperative implies 
homogenous responses for different categories of farmers. To see this, we 
plot in Figure 3.3 the distribution of the impact that cooperatives have on 
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6 Land in Ethiopia is the property of the state and cannot be owned by individual farmers. Never-
theless, land is allocated to households on a usufructuary basis for an undetermined period. 
Although land cannot be sold, it can be rented out and eventually passed on to heirs. The vari-
able we use here as “landholding” is the amount of land allocated by the state to the house-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.members’ percentage of production sold.7 The figure displays marked hetero-
geneity in member response to participation in cooperatives. Although for 
some cooperative members, the share of production sold is almost double 
that of their nonmember counterparts, for many other members, this level 
is significantly lower than that for their estimated counterparts—possibly 
despite higher prices within the cooperative.
  We further investigate this heterogeneity by interacting the treatment 
dummy (“Treatment ×”) with household-level variables, in columns (2) and 
(4) of Table 3.8. In column (2), none of the obtained coefficients on the 
interacted terms differs significantly from zero, indicating that no obvious 
heterogeneity exists between cooperative members regarding the impact 
on output price received. In column (4), however, we find that the effect 
of membership on the percentage of production sold increases significantly 
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7 Letting PS measure the household’s share of production sold and PS — the share of production 
sold by its generated counterfactual, the curves graphed in Figure 3.3 represent the distribution 
of the difference (PS – PS —), expressed as a percentage of PS —, across households.
Figure 3.3  Distribution of cooperative membership impact across 
households, kernel-density estimates
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).
Percentage difference in share of produce sold, between
actual observation and corresponding match
0







Propensity score8 Evidence has been uncovered suggesting that preference for food self-sufficiency falls with 
increasing income and/or wealth in Ethiopia (Taffesse, Bernard, and Yu 2007).
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with the size of the landholding, indicating that the larger a household’s 
landholding—standing in for potential production—the more responsive it will 
be to the price incentive secured by the cooperative. With an average impact 
of null, these results suggest that smaller farmers tend to be the ones substi-
tuting out of the market in response to the price increases.
  Given the staple nature of the crops considered, this phenomenon may 
be explained by the potentially counteracting effects of the price increase 
on the household’s production and consumption choices. Although a price 
increase will probably lead to a positive (or zero) production response, its 
effect on consumption is more ambiguous. As a consequence, the impact 
on marketed output is uncertain. This ambiguity may be the case particu-
larly for poorer households with lower capabilities of supply response and 
greater (positive) income elasticity of cereals consumption.8 Further research 
is needed, however, to elicit this hypothesis.
Conclusion
In Chapter 1 we hypothesized that collective action mechanisms can help small-
holders overcome marketing constraints. The results presented here offer a 
somewhat contrasting picture. Although cooperatives can effectively secure 
higher prices for their members’ output, this ability does not necessarily lead 
to an increase in the quantity of output commercialized by their members, 
suggesting (as indicated elsewhere in the literature) that price incentives 




his chapter investigates the extent to which RPOs constitute an effec-
tive means for reaching the rural poor. We explore the second issue 
presented in Chapter 1: do poorer households participate in Ethiopian 
cooperatives, and if not, do they nonetheless benefit indirectly from some of 
the cooperative’s activities?
Determinants of Household Participation
Only 17 percent of farm households with access to a cooperative in their 
kebele participated in it. Several reasons may explain this low level of parti-
cipation. Under the previous regime, cooperatives were used to extend strong 
government control to the local level and to promote socialist ideology 
through compulsory participation. Field observations suggest that a long pro-
cess of trust recovery is required for present-day cooperatives to overcome 
persisting suspicion and wariness on the part of potential members.
  Other reasons may be linked to a household’s economic incentive or 
the cooperative’s exclusive membership. Table 4.1 shows responses to the 
question (asked of nonmember households in kebeles that have a coopera-
tive): “Why did you decide not to join the cooperative?” For 59 percent of 
the respondents, the benefit of participation did not seem worth the effort 
or fee required. Another 39 percent would have participated had they been 
accepted. We analyze these two mechanisms below.
Household-Level Self-Exclusion
Small- and large-scale farmers tend not to participate in these organiza-
tions, resulting in what might be referred to as a “middle class” participa-
tion effect. As discussed in Chapter 1, this pattern of self-exclusion can be 
linked to a nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between the level of 
a household’s production and the benefit it may derive from participating in 
such organizations. Using the subset of kebeles with at least one cooperative, 
48we test for the existence of such a relationship using the ESCS (2005) survey. 
The analysis relies on logit estimates of the probability of membership, using 
a variety of household characteristics.
  In particular, we use landholding as a proxy for a farmer’s production 
level, as there is clearly a significant relationship between landholding and 
production. In addition, the relationship between landholding and coopera-
tive membership in Ethiopia is probably immune to the problem of reverse 
causality that would be likely to arise between participation in a cooperative 
and level of wealth.1
  However, such asset measures as number of oxen owned and house value 
(Table 4.2) may in part be determined by the household’s participation in 
the cooperative, insofar as participation makes the household wealthier and 
thus able to purchase more oxen and upgrade its housing. We nevertheless 
introduce them to assess the robustness of the results obtained in the first 
specification. Other household characteristics include the age and reading 
capacities of the household head, as well as a set of regional and ethnicity 
dummies.
  Overall, education and landholding seem to be the dominant variables 
explaining household participation in cooperatives. Thus the probability that 
a household participates in a cooperative is increased by 5–8 percent if the 
household head is literate.2 Participation also increases by 6–9 percent for 
each additional hectare of land. However, the marginal effect of landholding 
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Table 4.1  Reasons not to join the cooperative
Reason  Percent
Does not think he or she would benefit from the cooperative as it is; fees are too   58.92
  high compared to benefits 
Does not meet the requirement for membership; was not accepted or could not   38.86
  pursue membership 
Other  2.22
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).
1 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the exogeneity of land allocation in Ethiopia.
2 Overall, the literacy rate approaches 27 percent for nonmembers and 40 percent for members.   
If one considers that literacy is somewhat predetermined with regard to participation, and that 
the effect is not driven by other household (unobservable) characteristics, then education and 
literacy programs may constitute a powerful tool to promote participation in cooperatives. Test-
ing these assumptions would require a more sophisticated estimation of the participation equa-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































adecreases with the amount of land: very large farm households (holding more 
than 14 hectares) are less likely to participate.3
Cooperative Exclusiveness
The overall low participation in cooperatives may also be driven by their 
reluctance to include all potential members. As discussed earlier, inclusive 
membership implies two potentially opposing effects: (1) economies of scale 
in marketing surpluses and procuring inputs and (2) the offsetting increases 
in coordination costs that result from an increase in the number of members. 
Coordination costs may be particularly significant if increased membership is 
directly correlated with growing heterogeneity and divergent interests among 
members concerning the cooperative’s operations.
  In Table 4.3, we report on cooperative-level indicators of inclusiveness. 
We find that, although most cooperatives declare that their membership is 
open to all individuals, all of them condition membership on the fulfillment 
of particular criteria. For instance, 87 percent of the organizations only 
accept members living in the same kebele, a criterion that may be intended 
as a way of reducing monitoring costs among members. Surprisingly, asset 
ownership is not often cited as a primary criterion. But as these cooperatives 
are all mainly linked to agriculture, and most households control at least 
some land, an asset criterion would not be a discriminant in most cases. A 
more constraining criterion may be that all members must buy a share of the 
cooperative, which costs on average 45 birr (US$4.95) but can reach 1,000 
birr (US$110.00).4
  We investigate the potential effect of these membership criteria on 
actual membership structure in Table 4.4.5 Column (1) shows a positive rela-
tionship between both the kebele and the age criteria and the total number 
of members in the organization (expressed in log values). However, an oppo-
site effect is found with respect to the financial criterion. In column (2) we 
replace the financial criterion with the actual price of the cooperative share. 
Results are clearly robust, indicating that an increase of 1 birr (US$0.11) in 
the price of a cooperative share is typically associated with a 0.4 percent 
decrease in the size of the organization. Columns (3) and (4) report similar 
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3 Such “middle-class effects” are often observed in the collective action literature. See, for 
example, Weinberger and Juttin (2001).
4 Data limitations prevent us from relating cooperative membership fees (cooperative-level 
dataset) to the household decision to join the organization (household-level dataset).
5 Note that the reported coefficients are likely subject to various endogeneity biases and should 
only be interpreted as correlates.52  CHAPTER 4
Table 4.4  Membership criteria and actual membership
   Heterogeneity
    (coefficient of variation 
  Total membership (log)  for landholding)
Dependent variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Kebele criteria  0.477  0.287  0.018  0.027
 (0.256)*  (0.242)  (0.066)  (0.071)
Age criteria  0.336  0.379  –0.043  –0.002
 (0.200)*  (0.175)**  (0.052)  (0.051)
Asset criteria  –0.305  –0.422  –0.032  –0.016
 (0.345)  (0.317)  (0.089)  (0.093)
Financial criteria  –0.482   –0.095 
 (0.176)***    (0.045)** 
Share price    –0.004   0.0002
   (0.001)***    (0.0002)
Constant 6.040  6.136  0.462  0.364
 (0.314)***  (0.263)***  (0.081)***  (0.077)***
  Number of observations  171  169  171  169
Source:   Data are from ECS (2006).
Notes:   A kebele is a peasant association, the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia. Least 
square coefficients are reported. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. Coefficients 
are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 4.3  Cooperative-level indicators of inclusiveness
     Standard
Indicator Unit  Mean  deviation
Can anybody join the cooperative?  Percentage yes  73.26 
Are there any criteria to join the cooperative?  Percentage yes  100.00 
  Buy cooperative share and pay annual fee  Percentage yes  56.97 
  Live in the same kebele Percentage  yes  87.20 
  Minimum and/or maximum age requirement  Percentage yes  65.69 
  Ownership of specific asset  Percentage yes  7.55 
Price of cooperative share  Birr  45.24  96.39
Annual fee  Birr  5.56  9.62
Has anybody ever been refused membership   Percentage yes  8.77
  in the cooperative?   
Percentage of women in the cooperative  Percentage of   13.15  13.36
    members 
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ECS (2006).
Note:   A kebele is a peasant association, the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia.estimates, this time using the landholding heterogeneity—measured as the 
coefficient of variation of members’ landholdings—as the dependent variable. 
Although we do not find a clear negative effect of personal membership cri-
teria (location, age, or assets), financial criteria appear to be a statistically 
significant factor in membership.
  By and large, these results do support the hypothesis that cooperative 
membership is driven partly by household self-selection and partly by cooper-
ative exclusion policies. We find interesting that the exclusion of community 
members is not clearly stated as a policy but rather is implemented through 
potentially disqualifying financial criteria. This tacit approach may be related 
to the organization’s need to gain social acceptance and establish its legiti-
macy as well as to reduce the potential for intracommunity disharmony and 
jealousy—a phenomenon also observed in RPO studies in West Africa (for 
example, Bernard et al. 2008). The desire for such social acceptance may also 
explain the range of activities undertaken by the organization.
Public Goods and Services, and Spillover Effects
An organization’s inclusiveness may be defined more broadly than simply in 
terms of its membership. It may also be measured by whether an RPO’s bene-
fits extend beyond its membership base. For instance, ECS (2006) data reveal 
that 90 percent of nonmembers living in a kebele where a cooperative exists 
declared that they benefit “somehow” from the presence of the organization. 
This level is all the more important considering that only 24 percent of these 
organizations reported being engaged in any type of provision of public goods 
for the community.
  As shown in Table 4.5, an average marketing cooperative in Ethiopia reports 
being simultaneously engaged in more than four separate activities.6 Some 
of these are clearly complementary to marketing, shown in the upper part of 
the table. For instance, 84 percent of these organizations are also engaged 
in input provision, and 54 percent aim to provide credit to their members. 
Other activities are more remote from the marketing objective of the organi-
zation; these appear in the lower part of the table. Overall, 74 percent of the 
marketing organizations are also involved in nonmarketing-related activities, 
ranging from consumption services to HIV prevention.
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6 This figure does not imply that the cooperative is effectively providing this service, but rather 
that the service is part of its declared objectives. For instance, as discussed in the next chap-
ter, a large proportion of the cooperatives that declare being engaged in output marketing had 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.  Thus the extent to which nonmembers benefit from a cooperative depends 
on the cooperative’s portfolio of activities. Three categories of activities can 
be identified: activities directly beneficial to nonmembers, activities neutral 
to nonmembers, and those indirectly beneficial to nonmembers (Table 4.6).
Activities Directly Beneficial to Nonmembers
These are activities that allow the cooperative to benefit from scale econo-
mies. With regard to product aggregation, for instance, these activities may 
include the supply of production inputs (such as fertilizer) or the sale of 
surplus cereal output. Often the only difference in benefits accruing to mem-
bers versus nonmembers is limited to the distribution to members of profits 
or dividends that are generated from these services. For example, a study 
by Tendler (1983) finds that among cooperatives in Bolivia, nonmembers 
benefited, because RPOs tended to extend their services to nonmembers to 
establish larger economies of scale.
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Table 4.6  Who benefits from cooperative activities?
  Mean
Indicator  (% yes)
Do you feel that you benefit from the cooperative even though you are not 
  a member?a  89.59
Activities directly beneficial to nonmembers
  Has the cooperative provided fertilizers to its members in 2005?  74.27
    Has it also provided fertilizers to nonmembers in 2005?  71.65
  Has the cooperative provided pesticides to its members in 2005?  14.04
    Has it also provided pesticides to nonmembers in 2005?  58.33
  Has the cooperative provided seeds to its members in 2005?  53.22
    Has it also provided seeds to nonmembers in 2005?  57.14
Activities neutral to nonmembers
  Does the cooperative provide training to its members?  10.00
    Can nonmembers access this training?  50.00
  Does the cooperative formally share price information with its members?  80.00
    Can nonmembers formally access the information?  30.00
  Does the cooperative informally share price information with its members?  68.96
    Can nonmembers informally access the information?  75.86
Activities not beneficial to nonmembers
  Has the cooperative ever given credit in cash to its members?  60.00
    Do nonmembers have access?  10.71
Other activities
  Has the cooperative bought agricultural output from its members in 2005?  23.39
    Has it also bought agricultural output from nonmembers in 2005?  2.50
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005) and ECS (2006).
aFrom household-level interviews of nonmembers.Activities Neutral to Nonmembers
These activities may cover services for which nonmember participation entails 
only a low marginal cost to the organization. They include the provision of 
technical training in production techniques or information sharing on commod-
ity prices, for which an additional nonmember participating in the training 
or sharing incurs little in the way of incremental costs. For example, a study 
by Bernard, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2010) finds that among cooperatives in 
Burkina Faso, there is a tendency to provide services to nonmembers as a way 
of assuring acceptance of the cooperative in its village communities.
Activities Indirectly Beneficial to Nonmembers
Nonmembers may also benefit from unintended consequences of cooperative 
activities. For example, if an RPO successfully bargains for higher prices for 
its members’ output, local commodity prices that are offered to nonmembers 
may also increase as a result.7 Similarly, if an RPO contributes to public goods 
that serve their members and are nonexcludable to nonmembers (such as the 
construction of local roads, schools, or health centers), then nonmembers are 
indirect beneficiaries of the RPO’s contributions. In both cases, nonmembers 
may enjoy indirect benefits from the mere existence of the cooperative—a 
benefit they cannot be prevented from enjoying.
  We investigate the relevance of this classification in Table 4.6. Both the
activities undertaken by the organizations and the extent to which non-
members may benefit are given in the table. As expected, when activities are 
unambiguously associated with economies of scale, the corresponding service 
is often open to nonmembers. Such is the case for input provision services 
by cooperatives: nonmembers have access in the majority of cases. We also 
find that nonmembers tend to benefit from activities neutral to nonmembers, 
such as training (for instance, HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention) or the dis-
semination of price information. Regarding the latter benefit, it is interesting 
to note that, even if the cooperative is not willing to provide such services
to nonmembers, it is likely that outsiders would access it anyway, given the
nonexcludable and nonrivalrous nature of information. Although only 27 percent 
of the cooperatives share price information formally beyond their member-
ship, in 56 percent of the cases, outsiders can access it informally—through 
friends and family networks, for instance. Similarly, although robust empiri-
cal estimates are lacking, it is often reported that the simple presence of a 
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7 This effect may be particularly important in the case of input provision, where markets are 
often characterized by monopolistic competition. In these cases, RPOs tend to provide their 
members with inputs at cost, thereby exerting a downward pressure on the prices that other 
input suppliers can ask.cooperative involved in marketing significantly affects the price local traders 
offer to nonmembers.
  Table 4.6 also shows the more restricted benefits in activities not benefi-
cial to nonmembers—for example, the allocation of credit, typically in short 
supply in rural Ethiopia. In 72 percent of the cases where a cooperative gave 
credit to its members, it was unable to satisfy all its members’ demands. 
Accordingly, nonmembers access credit from the cooperative in less than 20 
percent of all cases.
  Finally, we report statistics on the purchase of outputs as an unclassified 
activity. Indeed, although there are clearly potential economies of scale in 
output marketing, there are also several risks involved. In many cases, coop-
eratives only broker a relationship between buyers (typically, local traders and 
cooperative unions) and sellers as a means of minimizing the risk of holding 
unsold output. When a cooperative actually buys smallholders’ surplus output, 
it often restricts this service to members who share the risk of unsold output 
(for instance, through a lower share of the profits generated from the collec-
tive marketing margins). Thus Table 4.6 shows that in only 2.5 percent of cases 
does a cooperative buy output from both its members and from nonmembers.
  Overall, the extent to which cooperatives benefit nonmembers depends 
on their willingness to engage in activities that are friendly or neutral to 
outsiders. In many cases, it is likely that poorer households will benefit less, 
because the gains are likely to be positively linked to the level of production 
(for instance, access to fertilizer at better prices will be more beneficial to 
an individual with larger fertilizer needs, that is, someone with a larger farm 
or landholding). In other cases, where no complementary asset determines 
the level of benefits—such as training on HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention—
poorer nonmembers may benefit just as much as their richer counterparts.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the findings presented here are broadly consistent with Issue 2 of 
Chapter 1: they suggest that the poorest of the poor tend to face considerable 
constraints on membership in marketing cooperatives. However, poorer non-
member households still benefit from positive spillovers generated by some 
types of cooperative activities, although these benefits are often limited in 
comparison to those accruing to members. Finally, it is important to note that 
data availability limited the nature and depth of the analysis. The geographic 
spread and role of cooperatives in Ethiopia are also changing. Both consider-
ations indicate the need for further data collection and analysis.
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Commercialization Performance of Cooperatives
T
his chapter investigates the actual marketing performance of coopera-
tives. We analyze the extent to which activity portfolio and member-
ship structure can account for the overall limited number of commer-
cially active organizations. We then examine how governance structure can 
be adapted to mitigate these effects.
Marketing Performance of Ethiopian Cooperatives
Although the cooperative movement in Ethiopia has chalked up successes 
in traditional export sectors, such as coffee (see Gabre-Madhin et al. 2003; 
Kodama 2007), its successes in the food staple sector are far fewer. During 
2003–07, cooperatives marketed 282,000 metric tons of grain, less than 1 
percent of total grain production in the country (Meherka 2008). In contrast, 
cooperatives marketed 357,000 metric tons of fertilizer, or 67 percent of all 
fertilizer imports and 85 percent of domestic fertilizer distribution (Meherka 
2008).
  Similar conclusions can be reached using the ECS (2006) data. As shown 
in Table 5.1, only 59 percent of the cooperatives that claimed to be engaged 
in marketing members’ output actually performed this activity during the 12 
months prior to the survey. For those cooperatives that did market output, the 
average value sold per member was 1,116 birr (about US$122.76), although for 
75 percent of them, the value was below 200 birr (about US$22.00).1
  We might hypothesize that this pattern reflects the organizations’ in-
capacities to effectively market their members’ products. However, the results 
presented in the previous chapter indicate that cooperatives that provide 
marketing services are relatively well organized to do so. As shown in Table 
5.1, these organizations tend to specialize in one or two products, storing 
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1 This measure was often not recorded in the cooperative registries; it was therefore collected 
from estimates by the woreda-level cooperative office, resulting in potentially large biases. For 
this reason, the following estimations are restricted to the binary performance indicator: “The 
cooperative has provided marketing services to its members over the past 12 months.”them for more than 3 months (on average) to secure higher prices. Price 
information is generally collected on one to three markets, including markets 
that are fairly distant from the location of the cooperative. No intermedi-
ary is used for transactions, which may contribute to the improved prices 
obtained by cooperatives for their members. We examined the knowledge of 
actual price levels for the Addis Ababa market and found it somewhat limit-
ed.2 This ignorance may be due, however, to the timing of our survey—about 
5 months before harvest.3 Overall, lack of marketing capacity does not seem 
to explain the finding that more than 40 percent of cooperatives officially 
engaged in output marketing did not sell any of their members’ output over 
the past 2 years.
  Another hypothesis is that members may be unwilling to sell their prod-
ucts through the organization. Although 82 percent of cooperative members 
said they were satisfied with their participation in the organization, only 40 
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Table 5.1  Marketing performance of Ethiopian cooperatives
 Description    25th  75th
Indicator and  unit  Mean  percentile  percentile
Sold members product over past   1 = yes (%)  58.72  0  1
  12 months 
Value sold last year  Birr  256,408  22,800  150,294
Value sold last year, per member  Birr  1,116.30  30.39  188.88
Number of product commercialized  Number  1.55  1  2
Stored product before selling?  1 = yes (%)  95.58  1  1
  Number of days of storage  Number  105.03  30  150
Collect price info before selling?  1 = yes (%)  85.29  1  1
  On how many markets?  Number  2.25  1  3
  Farthest market on which   Kilometers  99.6  5.5  69.25
    information is collected 
Knows price in Addis Ababa,   1 = yes (%)  37.27  0  1
  Ethiopia, today? 
Knows price in nearest woreda   1 = yes (%)  63.31  0  1
  market today? 
Used intermediary for transaction?  1 = yes (%)  4.14  0  0
Cooperative transported product for   1 = yes (%)  21.32  0  0
  transaction? 
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ECS (2006).
Note:   Woredas, or districts, are one of the smallest administrative units in Ethiopia.
2 Addis Ababa is by far the largest grain market in the country and is often considered to lead 
price evolution in other regional markets (Gabre-Madhin 2001).
3 The survey attempted to collect accounts of cooperative financial performance. Cooperative-
level data were, however, scarce and often of low reliability. Audits by woreda cooperative 
offices of primary cooperatives were also collected but proved insufficient in number and often 
concerned only the best-performing organizations.percent indicated that the main benefits they gain from cooperatives relate 
to the commercialization of their output. According to data from ESCS (2005), 
60 percent do not feel obligated to sell their product through the coopera-
tive, and of this group 71 percent sold none of their past season production 
to the cooperatives and only 14 percent sold all of it to these organizations. 
A possible conclusion is that the marketing functions of the cooperatives are 
not the primary attraction for their members. Note that cooperatives are also 
involved in other types of activities: 74 percent were engaged in activities 
with no apparent direct link to marketing.
Cooperative Activities, Membership, and Marketing Performance
In Table 5.2 we report the results of a series of tests of difference related to 
the activities undertaken by cooperatives and their marketing performance. 
The first three columns of the table relate characteristics of the coopera-
tive to its portfolio of activities—economic only versus mixed economic and 
social. Cooperatives with mixed portfolios have a significantly larger number 
of members but a lower average landholding than specialized organizations 
have. Thus multiple activities tend to attract more members but with less 
individual potential for product aggregation. Multipurpose cooperatives are, 
on average, older than their specialized counterparts.
  The last three columns of Table 5.2 show the results of similar tests of dif-
ferences, this time between cooperatives that provided marketing services to 
their members over the 12 months prior to the survey and those that did not. 
Although there are no significant differences in terms of membership, aver-
age landholding is greater for cooperatives providing marketing services.
  We further investigated whether large portfolios of activities may in part 
explain the apparently low marketing performance of cooperatives. Indeed, 
several studies have argued that by broadening their portfolio of activities, 
cooperatives often jeopardize their capacity to fulfill their initial purposes, 
especially when these activities are more diverse (Lele 1981; Collion and 
Rondot 2001). There have been two main explanations for this phenomenon. 
First, for a given size of organization, engaging in new activities increases 
management difficulties, which may negatively affect the quality of the service 
initially provided (Stringfellow et al. 1997). Second, for cooperatives spe-
cialized in a given activity, an increase in the heterogeneity of membership 
can lead to increased coordination costs, offsetting the benefits linked to 
economies of scale (Stockbridge, Dorward, and Kydd 2003). The analysis here 
focuses on the impact on coordination costs rather than on general manage-
ment problems.
  The rationale is as follows. By providing extra services, marketing cooper-
atives may become attractive to households that are otherwise uninterested 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.in its marketing activities. Additional members will increase the coordination 
costs (through an increase in size) without contributing to increased com-
mercialization benefits (through added output to be marketed). As a conse-
quence, some households that are uninterested in the additional service and 
only marginally interested in the commercialization services will revise their 
cost–benefit comparisons and leave the organization, further lowering com-
mercialization benefits for the remaining members. This in turn may prompt 
additional departures from the cooperative. In the extreme case, the mar-
keting cooperative will end up providing only noncommercialization services 
to its members. Only if there is substantial overlap between the two groups 
of members (those interested in commercialization and those attracted by 
the additional services)—in other words, if many households are likely to be 
interested in both services—can these supplementary activities reinforce the 
organization by providing more than one service at essentially constant costs. 
We test these relationships below.
Activities and Membership
Table 5.3 reports estimates of the correlation between various social activi-
ties and the size of cooperatives (columns (1) and (2)), and with the potential 
aggregated product as measured by the total land available among coopera-
tive members.4 Presumably, the introduction of these activities should lead 
to an increase in membership. However, if poorer households may be more 
interested in such social services, it follows that the overall product aggre-
gation should only slightly increase as a result of the introduction of these 
activities.
  In columns (1) and (3) we test for the effective significant influence of 
these activities on the size and product aggregation of the organization. 
The results indicate that consumption-related services as well as literacy 
training exert a strong positive influence on the size of the organization. 
The effect is somewhat weaker for product aggregation. Columns (2) and (4) 
assess the robustness of these results by adding a series of additional explana-
tory variables. In particular, we use the initial size of the organization as a 
proxy measure for members mostly interested in the marketing services of 
the organization. (Thus we assume that social activities were added later to 
the cooperatives, which is the case for nearly all of them.) The results on 
social activities are robust across all estimations as well as the coefficients 
obtained on the initial membership variable. In contrast, the effect of social 
activities on product aggregation vanishes once the impact of initial product 
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4 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the exogeneity of land allocation in Ethiopia.aggregation is accounted for. In all estimations, partial F-tests indicate the 
joint significance of the variables to be used as instruments later.
Membership and Performance
Table 5.4 further tests the above theory by relating the marketing perfor-
mance of a cooperative to its membership and aggregated product. Results 
from ordinary least squares estimates are shown in the table, with the basic 
model reported in column (1) and the more controlled one in column (2).5 The 
COMMERCIALIZATION PERFORMANCE  63   
Table 5.3  Social activities and size of cooperative
 Log  na  Log Qb
Characteristic  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Consumptionc 0.908  0.407  0.560  0.046
 (0.210)***  (0.133)***  (0.242)**  (0.174)
Literacyc 0.759  0.273  0.537  0.118
 (0.282)***  (0.163)*  (0.307)*  (0.183)
HIV preventionc  –0.316 0.055 –0.257 0.211
 (0.254)  (0.110)  (0.309)  (0.141)
Public infrastructurec  –0.100  –0.277 0.210  0.048
 (0.275)  (0.233)  (0.338)  (0.277)
Log (initial number of members)    0.511    0.535
   (0.085)***    (0.096)***
Age   0.040    0.054
   (0.017)**    (0.022)**
Partner at origin    0.204    0.446
   (0.122)*    (0.185)**
Financial help at origin    –0.384   –0.226
   (0.172)**    (0.234)
Controls for market access    Yes    Yes 
Controls for population density    Yes    Yes 
Constant 5.821  2.453  6.333  2.759
 (0.217)***  (0.477)***  (0.236)***  (0.725)***
  Number of observations  171  158  171  158
  R2 0.19  0.71  0.07  0.46
  F-test on significance  0.0004***  0.000***  0.0716  0.0000***
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ECS (2006).
Notes:   Robust standard errors are computed with clustering at the woreda level. Standard 
errors are listed in parentheses. A woreda, or district, is one of the smallest adminis-
trative units in Ethiopia. Numbers are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and 
*** 1 percent levels, respectively.
aDenotes the log value of the cooperative’s membership size.
bDenotes the log value of the cooperative’s potential aggregate product.
cF-test data given at end of table pertain to this characteristic.
5 The basic model is the simplest estimation containing the fewest number of variables and 
employing ordinary least squares.results are rather clear: for a given level of potential volume traded, a 1 per-
cent increase in the size of the organization typically leads to a decrease of 
14 percent in the chance that it provides marketing services to its members. 
Furthermore, a 1 percent increase in the level of overall potential volume-
traded aggregation leads to a 16 percent greater chance that the organization 
has performed marketing activities during the past 12 months. These effects 
are robust with the introduction, in the more controlled model (column (2)), 
of woreda-level characteristics controlling for the market opportunities faced 
by the cooperative, as well as the organization’s age, external partners, and 
financial support.6 These last characteristics may well influence member-
ship and be decisive in terms of marketing performance. The results are now 
slightly lower than initially, but remain with the expected sign and are sta-
tistically different from zero.
  Overall we find a rather clear correlation between a cooperative’s port-
folio of activities, its type of membership, and its marketing performance. 
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Table 5.4  Marketing performance of cooperatives
  Ordinary least squares  Two-stage least squares
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Log (number of members)  –0.143  –0.124  –0.589  –0.520
 (0.073)**  (0.061)*  (0.206)***  (0.195)***
Log (aggregated product)  0.164  0.132  0.637  0.540
 (0.059)***  (0.056)**  (0.221)***  (0.205)***
Age of cooperative (years)    0.002    –0.001
   (0.009)    (0.010)
Partner at origin    0.202    0.112
   (0.064)***    (0.094)
Financial help at origin    0.069    –0.032
   (0.088)    (0.111)
  Controls for market access    Yes    Yes
  Controls for population density    Yes    Yes
  Number of observations  168  162  162  156
  R-squared 0.07*  0.19***    0.17
  Sargan test, p-value     0.8417  0.7868
  Basmann test, p-value     0.8481  0.8049
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ECS (2006).
Note:   Numbers are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, 
respectively.
6 We use the cooperative’s partners and financial help at inception to avoid two-way relation-
ships with the organization’s performance.These correlations face significant potential endogeneity problems, however, 
as the marketing performance of the cooperative may itself influence both 
the number and type of members. For instance, an organization that performs 
well may attract more members than does a weakly performing one.7 As a 
result, the estimates of membership on performance are likely to understate 
the magnitude of the (negative) relationship. Similar arguments may apply 
to aggregated product, although the sign would then be undetermined. Such 
biases can be overcome using an external source of variation in both member-
ship and aggregated product.
  To overcome this potential bias, we use the above theory to justify the 
use of social activities as instruments for the size of the cooperative. To be 
valid, however, these instruments must respect the following three criteria:
1.   a cooperative’s engagement in such activities was not driven by its mar-
keting performance;
2.   there are no other unaccounted-for factors that may have driven both a 
cooperative’s marketing performance and its portfolio of activities; and
3.   the effect of these social activities on marketing performance is uniquely 
driven by their effects on membership.
The strong governmental and external partners’ support for social activities 
in cooperatives tend to support criterion 1. For instance, the Federal Coop-
erative Commission requires that all registered cooperatives allocate between 
1 and 5 percent of their earnings to a social fund that finances such activi-
ties as HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention training. Further, controlling for 
a cooperative’s external partner may address concerns regarding criterion 
2. However, criterion 3 cannot be directly tested unless other sets of instru-
ments are also available. As described below, we use a cooperative’s original 
number of members as an extra instrument to perform such tests.
  These results are presented in columns (3) and (4) in Table 5.4, where 
we report two-stage least square estimates of a linear probability model of 
marketing performance. The results suggest that the relationships identified 
in the left part of the table hold, once one accounts for potential sources of 
endogeneity. In addition, the numbers tend to be higher in magnitude, sup-
porting the idea of a reverse causality. Overall, the results suggest that a 1 
percent increase in the size of the organization may lead to a 0.3 percent 
decrease in the probability that it provides marketing services to its mem-
bers. Finally, we use Sargan’s (1958) and Basmann’s (1960) overidentification 
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7 However, most of the organizations (75 percent) have increased their memberships since their 
creation.tests to verify that social activities are in effect not directly correlated with 
marketing performance. Accordingly, we cannot reject the exogeneity of our 
instruments at any reasonable confidence level.
  Overall, these results tend to support the claim that a wide scope of activi-
ties may significantly affect membership structure. This structure may in turn 
impinge on the organization’s capacity to effectively provide marketing ser-
vices to its members. Governance structure may help mitigate these effects, 
as we explore in the next section.
Governance Structure
Under the Federal Cooperative Agency’s guidance, efforts to promote coop-
eratives in Ethiopia are designed to follow the principles set down by the 
International Cooperative Alliance and are meant to replicate global best 
practices. Use of such guidelines introduces a certain degree of standardiza-
tion in the design of cooperative governance, management, and membership. 
The reforms are meant to ensure that cooperatives are governed in accordance 
with standard bylaws that provide for the regular election of chairpersons and 
management committees, and voting based on the principle of one member–
one vote. For example, to receive a registration certificate from the regional 
BoCP, a cooperative must demonstrate that it has at least 10 members, is 
owned by its membership, and has put in place certain bylaws that govern 
the election of leaders, management of cooperative affairs, and so on. Thus, 
for example, ECS (2006) data show that in 99 percent of cases, all members 
are authorized to vote in their cooperative’s election for chairman, and in 97 
percent of cases, the vote is organized on a one-member–one-vote basis. How-
ever, anecdotal evidence suggests that beyond elections, members are some-
times left with little influence on the direction taken by the cooperative.
  These divergences may be related to the possible existence of trade-offs 
between the various dimensions of inclusiveness, on the one hand, and the 
organization’s performance, on the other. For instance, a cooperative may 
choose to explicitly or implicitly exclude new members to maintain cohesive-
ness among its existing members, minimize transaction costs that result from 
participatory decisionmaking, and ensure effective performance. Alterna-
tively, cooperatives may choose to cast their membership more widely and 
allow both the size and the interests of the membership to expand. Increased 
size and diversified interests may lead to an expansion of the cooperative’s 
portfolio of activities, and may incur higher transaction costs for the coopera-
tive’s participatory decisionmaking processes.
  We empirically investigate the decisionmaking process in Ethiopian coop-
eratives through participation indicators, based on a series of questions meant 
66  CHAPTER 5to identify who the decisionmakers are for a series of commonly taken deci-
sions on
 1.   the inclusion of new members,
 2.   the expulsion of existing members,
 3.   the start of a new activity in the cooperative,
 4.   the collaboration with a new partner,
 5.   the amount of dividends to be distributed,
 6.   the investment in new materials or infrastructure,
 7.   the amount of output to buy,
 8.   the amount of output to sell,
 9.   the amount of output to store,
10.   the amount of input to buy,
11.   the amount of input to sell,
12.   the time to sell,
13.   the price given to members for their outputs,
14.   the person or organization to buy input from,
15.   the person or organization to sell output to, and
16.   the market on which to sell.
  For each decision, we recorded whether all members participated in the 
decision process (for example, through a vote in the general assembly) or 
the decision was left to a restricted number of individuals (such as the 
management committee or the president). We then computed participation 
indicators as the percentage of decisions that were open to all members. 
Three indicators are specifically considered: a general indicator taking all 
decisions into account, an indicator limited to general organizational deci-
sions (decisions 1–6 above), and an indicator limited to technical decisions 
(decisions 7–16).
  Our results show that on average 19 percent of all decisions are open to 
all members. For general organizational decisions, the average reaches 38 
percent, compared to only 8 percent for technical decisions. The low level of 
participation in technical decisions is to be expected. More surprising, how-
ever, is the low level of participation in general decisions. More information 
can be drawn from the distributions of these variables, as shown in Figure 
5.1. Clearly, in the vast majority of cooperatives, most—if not all—technical 
decisions are taken by the management committee. In contrast, the distribu-
tion of the indicator for general decisions is clearly bimodal: some coopera-
tives are more or less fully participatory, whereas others are almost fully 
nonparticipatory. We classify the former as high-participation and the latter 
as low-participation organizations.
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We now investigate the relationship among membership, governance, and per-
formance. The results are reported in Table 5.5. The results do not account for 
likely endogeneity biases and should therefore be interpreted only as correla-
tions. Nevertheless, they are useful in pinpointing eventual trade-offs relevant 
for future, and more robust, analysis.
  In column (4), we also introduce proxies for the quality of cooperative 
management with two additional variables: share of committee members who 
can read and the maximum level of education among committee members. 
The estimated parameters for these proxies are not significant, but the param-
eters estimated for our original set of variables remain robust. Overall, these 
results clearly show some trade-off between two objectives: (1) the extent to 
which a cooperative can open its membership (and allow more heterogeneity) 
or give voice to its members through participatory decisionmaking and (2) the 
extent to which it can maintain a minimum performance level in its economic 
activities.
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Figure 5.1  Participatory decisionmaking
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ESCS (2005).
Note:   Density distribution of cooperatives is calculated according to the percentage of 
decisions taken by the general assembly.Conclusion
As noted while exploring Issue 3 in Chapter 1, a large portfolio of activities 
may jeopardize a cooperative’s capacity to provide marketing services to its 
members. Results presented here tend to support this conjecture, via the 
effect of an organization’s scope of activities on its membership structure. 
We found, however, that this effect may—in part—be counteracted by appro-
priate decisionmaking structures.
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Table 5.5  Membership, governance, and performance (ordinary 
least squares)
  Cooperative has sold members’
  output in 2005 (0/1)
Dependent variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Total landholding in the cooperative (log)  0.144  0.142  0.144  0.138
  (0.049)*** (0.050)*** (0.049)*** (0.051)***
Total membership (log)  –0.139  –0.138  –0.141  –0.134
  (0.058)** (0.058)** (0.062)** (0.065)**
Heterogeneity (coefficient of variation   0.193  0.196  0.390  0.390
  for landholding)  (0.112)*  (0.112)*  (0.145)**  (0.151)**
High participation (0/1)    –0.047 0.055 0.048
    (0.068) (0.347) (0.360)
High participation × Total membership      0.030  0.030
     (0.052)  (0.054)
High participation × Heterogeneity      –0.497  –0.484
     (0.217)**  (0.227)**
Percentage of committee members who         –0.092
  can read        (0.225)
Maximum education level in committee        0.021
      (0.057)
Age  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market access is high (0/1)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Population  density  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations  162  162  162  161
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on data from ECS (2006).




ver the past few years, policymakers, international donors, and devel-
opment practitioners have shown a renewed interest in RPOs as a means 
to attain several goals: connecting smallholders to markets, allevi-
ating rural poverty, and promoting agricultural development and economy-
wide growth. This interest has re-emerged, despite the rather troubled his-
tory of RPOs in the region from the postcolonial era of the 1960s through the 
structural adjustment programs of the 1980s.
  With the recent emergence of a new type of RPO—one that is more respon-
sive to the priorities of the community it serves, more independent of state 
control, and more oriented to the provision of market-related services—there 
is hope that collective action organizations can play a larger and more sup-
portive role in smallholder commercialization than they currently do. How-
ever, in spite of success stories accumulating around RPOs engaged in high-
value crop marketing, there is scarce evidence to suggest that RPOs are playing 
the same role with respect to the marketing of cereals. And it is precisely 
these cereals that are the key to large-scale poverty reduction, agricultural 
development, and economywide growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.
  This study provides new insights into the question of what RPOs can and 
cannot do to support smallholder cereal producers in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
study identifies the conditions under which RPOs engaged in cereal marketing 
are successfully promoting smallholder commercialization and examines how 
the benefits of this commercialization process are distributed.
  Specifically, this study investigates three broad issues. First, what role 
does collective action play in helping smallholders overcome marketing con-
straints? Second, to what extent do poorer households tend to participate in 
RPOs? Third, what are the principal constraints on an RPO’s marketing per-
formance? Our findings suggest the following.
  First and foremost, collective action can indeed be an effective means to 
provide marketing services to farmers facing prohibitive transaction costs. In 
fact, cooperatives deliver, on average, a 7 percent price premium for their 
members’ output, relative to what these farmers would have received had 
70they decided to market their output individually. Cooperatives are able to 
do this by collecting price information on several markets before choosing 
which market to sell in, storing members’ surpluses as a hedge against low 
postharvest prices, and eschewing the use of market intermediaries.
  Second, the downside to this premium is that the smallest farmers tend to 
market only the quantity necessary to meet their basic needs; and, because 
of the premium offered by the cooperative, this amount is less than the total 
quantity they would otherwise market individually. As a result, the actual 
quantity of grain coming to market from this cohort of farmers is less than it 
would be without the cooperative’s services. In a country where the supply of 
grain regularly falls short of demand, this issue is of strategic importance.
  Third, smaller farmers tend to self-exclude from participating in coop-
eratives, as their returns from membership are less than the costs of mem-
bership. This tendency may be partly attributable to membership fees that 
exceed the gains accruing from the price premium generated from collective 
marketing of smallholder surpluses.
  Fourth, some degree of exclusion is necessary for cooperatives to main-
tain a certain degree of homogeneity in the cooperative’s membership—that 
is, homogeneity in members’ interests or levels of commitment. This neces-
sity has implications for those who view cooperatives as a means of mobilizing 
entire rural communities or want to leverage cooperatives for the expression 
of the community voice.
  Fifth—and in spite of the practice of exclusion—there is evidence to sug-
gest that for some services, excluded poorer farmers may still benefit from the 
presence of cooperatives. For example, cooperatives may exert upward pres-
sure on output prices among local traders or provide public goods from which no
individual can be excluded. However, these spillover benefits for nonmembers 
tend to be small compared to the total benefits accruing to members.
  Sixth, the evidence suggests that grain-marketing cooperatives in Ethiopia 
are engaged in a wide range of nonmarketing activities. A striking feature of 
these organizations is their involvement in such activities as HIV/AIDS pre-
vention and awareness and literacy training. Such social activities are often 
promoted by external partners—both state and nonstate actors—because they 
view cooperatives as an efficient way of reaching the rural poor. However, 
the evidence suggests that inclusion of such nonmarketing activities may 
significantly affect membership structure, thus reducing the cooperative’s 
capacity to provide marketing services to its members.
  Seventh, the evidence also suggests that different types of cooperative 
governance can similarly affect the cooperative’s capacity to provide market-
ing services to its members. This finding illustrates the difficulties that RPOs 
face in balancing social inclusion and participatory decisionmaking on the one 
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the other. Thus the burgeoning interest in farmer cooperatives in Ethiopia is 
not amenable to the one-size-fits-all strategy that is rapidly evolving.
  Critics may argue that these findings are specific to grain-marketing coop-
eratives in Ethiopia and are an exception to the general trend found in the 
rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. In response, we would suggest that the Ethiopian 
experience provides more of a model than critics might recognize. Apart 
from the historical similarities with other Sub-Saharan African countries—the 
imposition of state control over grain marketing and the manipulation of 
cooperatives for political ends—Ethiopia’s more recent experience suggests 
that large-scale investment in promoting smallholder cooperatives and com-
mercialization is not without significant challenges.
  Nevertheless, provided that these challenges are acknowledged and ac-
counted for in the design of policies and choices for investment, there is 
great potential for RPOs to play a central role in smallholder commercializa-
tion. With this in mind, we offer the following recommendations based on 
the findings of this study.
1.   Cooperatives are not a silver bullet for removing the constraints to small-
holder commercialization. Cooperatives are beset by unique—and often 
intractable—challenges relating to their agenda, structure, membership, 
management, and governance.
2.   Cooperatives are not necessarily an efficient means of targeting the poor-
est of the poor. Alternative and complementary support mechanisms must 
be used to protect more vulnerable social groups and, over time, increase 
their capacity to participate effectively in cooperatives.
3.   Cooperatives must be free to choose their own agendas and to develop the 
management and governance systems that are most appropriate to their 
agendas. Although external actors, such as public agencies and NGOs, may 
have a role to play in building cooperative members’ capacity to govern 
and manage their own organization, they can do irreparable harm to the 
organization’s future capacity to serve its members by imposing their own 
agenda. This issue is particularly important with respect to the imposition 
of nonmarketing activities on cooperatives that are formed for and dedi-
cated to commercialization.
  Although more theoretical and empirical work is needed to fully understand 
the inherent challenges and trade-offs in smallholder organization, there are 
lessons to be learned here for other initiatives promoting RPOs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Sovereign governments, international donors, and development prac-
titioners have moved to reinstate RPOs squarely on the global development 
agenda. As these actors move forward with investments based on a limited 
72  CHAPTER 6number of success stories, there is a need for more robust empirical evidence 
of what RPOs can and cannot achieve. At present, there is little empirical data 
to suggest that due consideration has been given to the trade-offs inherent in 
grain-marketing cooperatives—a class of RPOs that is highly relevant to many 
small-scale, resource-poor farmers in the region. There remains a sizable 
knowledge gap with respect to grain-marketing cooperatives and the trade-
offs inherent in their design, promotion, and impact.
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ural producer organizations (RPOs), such as farmers’ organizations or rural co-
operatives, offer a means for smallholder farmers in developing countries to sell 
their crops commercially. RPOs hold particular promise for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where small-scale farming is the primary livelihood but commercialization of foodcrops 
is very limited. Using the experience of smallholders in Ethiopia as a case study, this 
research monograph identifies the benefits of RPOs for small farmers, as well as the 
conditions under which such organizations most successfully promote smallholder com-
mercialization.  The evidence from Ethiopia indicates that RPOs do increase farmers’ 
profits from crop sales, but that the beneficiaries do not tend to be the poorest small-
holders. Moreover, an RPO’s marketing effectiveness is precarious: it can easily diminish 
if the number or diversity of its members increases or if it provides more nonmarketing 
services. The authors conclude that RPOs have a role to play in the agricultural develop-
ment of Sub-Saharan Africa, but that role should be complemented by other programs 
that directly target the poorest farmers. Further, the effectiveness of RPOs should be 
preserved by allowing them to follow their own agendas rather than being encouraged 
to take on nonmarketing activities. The assessment of RPOs presented in this mono-
graph should be a valuable resource for policymakers and researchers concerned with 
economic development and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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